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ABSTRACT 
 
Current renewable energy (RE) technologies are insufficient to satisfactorily address the 
urgent, time-critical concerns of climate change and energy security. Consequently, 
there has been a surge in global interest in accelerating RE innovation. Yet, substantial 
problems confront RE innovation. An emerging and highly useful theoretical 
framework for studying the processes and problems in innovation is innovation systems. 
This framework emphasizes comparisons between real innovation systems rather than 
abstract ideals. Many regard Silicon Valley as the quintessential example a high-tech 
innovation system. 
Thus, this dissertation synthesizes new insights and recommendations to overcome the 
problems confronting RE innovation processes from an examination of the processes 
and determinants of Silicon Valley’s success. The study demonstrates that Silicon 
Valley is a valid and relevant example. Lessons underscore the importance of policy 
stability and consistency throughout the system, funding models appropriately adapted 
to the stage of innovation, an increase in the number and quality of points of contact 
between agents in the system, and the complementary roles of the entrepreneur and 
collaborative collective in an optimized culture for RE innovation. 
Keywords: Renewable energy, Innovation Systems, Silicon Valley  
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RESUMO 
 
O estado atual das tecnologias de energia renovável (ER) é inadequado para dar 
resposta às urgentes preocupações sobre as alterações climáticas e a segurança no 
abastecimento de energia. Consequentemente, tem havido um aumento no interesse 
global em acelerar a inovação em ER. No entanto, significativos problemas confrontam 
o fluxo de inovação em ER. Uma abordagem emergente e altamente útil para estudar os 
processos e problemas da inovação é sistemas de inovação. Esta abordagem enfatiza 
comparações entre sistemas de inovação reais ao invés de ideais abstractos. Muitos 
consideram Silicon Valley o ex-líbris de um sistema de inovação de alta tecnologia. 
Assim, a presente dissertação apresenta e produz novas perspetivas e recomendações 
para superar os problemas que confrontam os processos de inovação em ER, com 
recurso à examinação dos processos e determinantes do sucesso de Silicon Valley. O 
estudo demonstra que Silicon Valley é, de facto, um exemplo válido e relevante. As 
lições retiradas sublinham a importância da estabilidade e consistência de políticas em 
todo sistema, dos modelos de financiamento adequados ao estado da inovação, do 
aumento na quantidade e qualidade dos pontos de contacto entre os agentes no sistema, 
e dos papéis complementares do empreendedor e do coletivo, numa cultura otimizada à 
inovação em ER. 
Palavras-chave: Energia renovável, Sistemas de inovação, Silicon Valley 
 
 
 
  
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................. 5 
2.1 Traditional theories: external economies and agglomeration ................................. 6 
2.2 Modern production-cost approaches ....................................................................... 8 
2.3 Clusters ................................................................................................................. 11 
2.4 Networks and innovation systems ........................................................................ 13 
3. THE SILICON VALLEY MODEL ............................................................................ 16 
3.1 Foundational factors – Stanford University and the U.S. military ....................... 18 
3.2 Reinforcing forces and characteristics .................................................................. 28 
3.2.1 Evolving institutions– Venture capital and Law firms .................................. 30 
3.2.2 Networks connect the ecosystem ................................................................... 34 
3.2.3 Culture ........................................................................................................... 35 
3.2.4 Spinoff dynamic ............................................................................................. 37 
4. RENEWABLE ENERGY INNOVATION ................................................................ 40 
4.1 Characterization of energy .................................................................................... 40 
4.2 Renewable energy innovation vis-à-vis general technology ................................ 41 
4.3 Problems in renewable innovation and lessons from the Valley .......................... 42 
4.3.1 Lack of stability and consistency in government policy ................................ 42 
4.3.2 Poor funding models appropriate to stage of development ........................... 44 
4.3.3 Market bias towards embeddedness, the ‘Valley of Death’, and externalities
 ................................................................................................................................ 46 
4.3.4 Knowledge diffusion ...................................................................................... 48 
4.3.5 Rules and norms of the innovation system .................................................... 50 
5. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 53 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 57 
ANNEX 1 - Nine characteristics of the innovation systems framework ........................ 65 
ANNEX 2 - Technology-emergence pathways and corresponding recommendations .. 67 
  
 vi 
INDEX OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Porter's Competitive Diamond Model. ............................................................ 12 
Figure 2: Silicon Valley and Environs. ........................................................................... 16 
Figure 3: The Silicon Valley Innovation System mid-20
th
 Century. .............................. 28 
Figure 4: Silicon Valley Waves of Innovation, 1950-2000s .......................................... 29 
  
 vii 
INDEX OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Renewables Innovation: Systemic Problems and Recommendations .............. 52 
 
 
 
 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The voracious consumption of fossil-based energy has fueled our global prosperity for 
more than two centuries, but has also outstripped earth's absorptive capacity, raising the 
specter of climate change. Crucial to meeting climate change mitigation objectives, 
while ‘keeping the lights on’, is the development and deployment of renewable energy 
(RE) to substitute fossil-based energy production. More than timely, it is urgent that we 
redouble efforts to add to the body of knowledge that might guide and foster conditions 
for the acceleration of innovation in RE systems. 
By the end of 2010, concentrations of CO2-equivalent
1
 (CO2-eq) had reached 390 ppm, 
39% above pre-industrial levels. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007) concluded 
that most of this change is “very likely” the result of increases in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) generation. Baseline scenarios (‘business as usual’) place the 
rise in mean global temperatures by 2100 to between 1.1°C and 6.4°C over the 1980 to 
1999 average (IPCC, 2007b, IPCC 2012). While the long-term consequences of climate 
change are poorly understood, its projected impact to earth’s biological systems as well 
as our human economies is sobering. As with most things, the consensus is that the 
sooner we act, the less costly it will be to meet climate change mitigation objectives and 
attenuate adverse consequences. To that end, and in order to limit this temperature 
increase to between 2°C to 2.4°C, GHG concentrations must be stabilized in the range 
of 445 to 490 ppm CO2-eq (IPCC 2012).  
Electricity generation from fossil fuels accounts for a significant portion of these 
emissions
2
. Lifecycle GHG emissions from RE technologies are significantly lower 
than those of fossil fuels, with median values for all RE ranging from 4 to 46 g CO2-
                                                        
1
 CO2-equivalent is a “standard metric for comparing emissions of different GHGs but does not imply the 
same climate change responses”. “GHGs differ in their warming influence (radiative forcing) on the 
global climate system due to their different radiative properties and lifetimes in the atmosphere. CO2-eq 
emission is the amount of CO2 emission that would cause the same time-integrated radiative forcing, over 
a given time horizon… The equivalent CO2 emission is obtained by multiplying the emission of a GHG by 
its Global Warming Potential (GWP) for the given time horizon”, often 100 years (IPCC 2007a). 
2
 For example, total U.S. energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) by the electric power sector in 
2011 were 2,166 million metric tons, or about 40% of total U.S. energy-related CO2 emissions. Of these 
40%, coal was responsible for 79% and natural gas for 19%  (U.S. Energy Information Administration). 
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eq/kWh, while those for fossil fuels range from 469 to 1,001 g CO2-eq/kWh (excluding 
land use change emissions). Capacity-wise, RE could displace fossil generation, as total 
global technical potential
3
 for RE is substantially higher than present and projected 
global energy demand. Thus, RE possess clear GHG emission mitigating potential
4
. By 
substituting much of fossil-based generation capacity with RE, and, furthermore, largely 
transitioning transportation from combustible fossil fuels to cleanly generated 
electricity, it is possible for the global economy to transform itself into a low-carbon 
economy (IPCC 2012). Additionally, while renewables are typically an intermittent 
energy source, the parameters of production are known such that, as part of a portfolio 
of strategically placed installations throughout the state (or integrated states) tied into a 
national (or supranational) grid, RE could offer a reliable source of energy at stable, 
know factor prices, itself invaluable to business planning and economic growth. 
Nevertheless, persuasive reasons for pursuing renewable energy extend well beyond 
climate change concerns. Indeed, the promise of a “green energy economy” has become 
itself a political platform, touting economic renewal and job creation “for the 21st 
century”. The prospect of renewables-derived electricity reducing dependence on oil in 
transportation – and eventually supplanting it – would significantly lessen exposure to 
the cost risks inherent in procuring this globally bid-up primary energy from politically 
unstable regions of the world. This would also, of course, mean reduced currency 
outflows for importing nations and so an improved current account balance, with that 
money benefiting the domestic economy. However, for oil exporting countries, this 
would also help support a responsible management of their exhaustible resources. 
Additionally, even if GHG mitigation were not an objective, demand for RE is 
projected to continue to grow. Here also, investing in the innovation of RE technologies 
                                                        
3
 Technical potential in this context is “the amount of RE output obtainable by full implementation of 
demonstrated technologies or practices” (IPCC 2012).  
4
 Four illustrative IPCC (2012) scenarios “span a range of global cumulative CO2 savings between 2010 
and 2050, from about 220 to 560 Gt CO2 compared to about 1,530 Gt cumulative fossil and industrial 
CO2 emissions in the IEA World Energy Outlook 2009 Reference Scenario during the same period”; that 
is, up to more than 1/3 avoided emissions. 
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offers a tremendous economic opportunity through the export
5
 of technology, related 
services, and manufactured durables.  
However, current RE technologies are inadequate to fully meet the challenges and 
realize the potential benefits (OECD 2011, Bonvillian and Weiss 2009). Innovation
6
 is 
needed. Further, the innovation process is time-critical, whether we consider the time 
constraint is planetary (climate change mitigation), policy-based (standards), or market-
based (first-to-market, competitive advantage). Thus, accelerated innovation is needed. 
To accelerate innovation in RE, we must understand the processes of innovation itself, 
where and how it arises, and what problems obstruct its dynamic in RE. 
Competitive advantages and innovation capabilities are heavily localized, making the 
region the appropriate level to study industrial organization and innovation activity (Yu 
and Jackson 2011). With regard to industrial organization
7, Porter’s (1990b) clusters 
have become a useful reference. As to the specific study of innovation activity, the 
innovation system (IS) approach is an emerging and highly useful conceptual 
framework that regards the whole innovation process as systems-oriented, emphasizing 
the interdependency of the agents involved. This approach also emphasizes empirically 
based “appreciative” theorizing, rather than formal theories, to ‘capture processes of 
innovation, their determinants, and some of their consequences in a meaningful way’ 
(Edquist and Hommen 1999:66).  
Silicon Valley is assuredly the world’s preeminent empirical model of an accelerated, 
effectual, and efficient innovation system / high-tech cluster; innovation that serves as 
the foundation of a truly dynamic and vibrant regional economy. While many 
comprehensive and thoughtful efforts have been made to understand the reasons for the 
success of Silicon Valley – often with the goal of guiding efforts to replicate this 
success in similar technology clusters – the aim of this dissertation is to examine the 
Silicon Valley experience for its processes and determinants; for guidance in addressing 
the problems confronting RE innovation systems, and thereby promote robust RE 
                                                        
5
 Most IPCC (2012) RE deployment scenarios show total RE deployment is higher over the long term in 
non-Annex I countries than in Annex I countries in most scenarios. 
6
 Herein, innovation refers to invention implemented; ideas successfully brought to market. 
7
 Many approaches have evolved to study the dynamic of the regional economy and its innovation 
activity, and it is important to understand these antecedents, as the literature review shall explore. 
 4 
innovation systems with high success probability.  
The methodology employed is a qualitative, critical analysis of the Silicon Valley 
experience – with recourse to the essential concepts in the innovation process, namely 
the forces of industrial clustering and the framework of innovation systems, and their 
antecedents – to thus synthesize new insights and recommendations to overcome the 
problems confronting RE innovation processes; thereby, promoting robust and efficient 
loci of RE innovation. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 contextualizes and conceptually 
equips the discussion with a survey of the literature regarding the progression of 
thought on the economics of concentrated, specialized regions, their competitiveness, 
and the innovation activity within them; from Marshallian agglomeration economies 
through to localized innovation systems. Section 3 explores the factors and 
characteristics critical to the success of the Silicon Valley innovation system. Section 4 
analyzes the systemic problems plaguing RE innovation systems. Section 5 briefly 
discusses the findings and concludes.  
The main conclusion presented is that the Silicon Valley model is indeed relevant and 
can be looked to for concrete guidance in addressing the systemic problems confronting 
RE innovation systems. Lessons underscore the importance of policy stability and 
consistency throughout the system, funding models appropriately adapted to the stage of 
innovation, an increase in the number and quality of points of contact between agents in 
the system, and the complementary roles of the entrepreneur and collaborative 
collective in an optimized culture for RE innovation. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
At a time when we reflexively raise the efforts of enterprise to a global scale, invoke 
global value chains, and tout the dissemination of communication technologies as de-
leveraging the advantages of physical proximity, the role of nations, let alone regions 
within nations, may seem comparatively unimportant or surpassed in its timeliness. 
Nevertheless, in firms’ ceaseless endeavor to innovate, gain and sustain advantage, the 
role of location is, as Porter (1990b) points out, always crucial. Paul Krugman (1996) 
likewise centers on the importance of the regional economies, as opposed to national 
economies or global companies, as the driving centers of economic activity and wealth 
creation within the global economy – the ‘localization of the world economy’. 
Likewise, the process of innovation – especially in high technology – only atypically 
takes place in isolation. Rather, a myriad of interdependent agents – scientists, 
researchers, investors, specialized suppliers, producers, etc. – engaging in both market 
exchanges and non-market knowledge and influence flows, are indispensible to this 
complex and necessarily concerted activity. Moreover, these exchanges and flows are 
not unidirectional, but characterized by a multiplicity of learning interactions and 
feedback loops
1
. Further, these agents interact in a context of established institutions 
such as laws, rules, regulations, norms, and shared culture.  
The conceptual framework that best captures these systemic processes and relations– 
and so too provides the best instrument for understanding the problems obstructing 
innovation dynamics – is the emerging conceptual framework of innovation systems2  
(Edquist and Hommen 1999, Saxenian 1994). Highly effective innovation systems are 
characterized by localization and so are often approached as regional innovation 
systems, wherein the process of innovation finds its critical mass of agents (Yu and 
Jackson 2011).  
While the dissertation most avails itself of the conceptual framework of innovation 
systems to study the problems confronting RE innovation, antecedent as well as current 
                                                        
1
 E.g.: consumers engaging with suppliers on product specifications. 
2
 Alternatively: systems of innovation. 
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complementary approaches provide highly useful concepts and insights into the forces 
and process underpinning economic concentration and the innovative activities therein. 
The following subsections examine traditional agglomerations economies, through to 
likewise production-cost driven but more complex modern approaches and clusters, and 
into networks and systems-oriented frameworks. 
 
2.1 Traditional theories: external economies and agglomeration 
 
Traditionally, regional development and its supporting policies have been approached 
through the concept of external economies. This consists of looking at the productive 
factors lying outside the individual firm. These ‘external economies’ are, quite simply, 
the ‘benefit from sharing the costs of common external resources such as infrastructure 
and services, skilled labor pools, specialized suppliers, and a common knowledge base’. 
When these factors of production become concentrated in a given geography, or region, 
the additional benefits of spatial proximity are referred to as economies of 
agglomeration. Once established, the presence of external economies creates a self-
reinforcing advantage (Saxenian 1994). 
When studying modern economic agglomerations we are in essence studying the 
ancient, primary organizing principle of society: fragmentation and assignment of roles, 
or, if you will, specialization and division of labor. While the benefits and efficiencies 
arising from such organization have long been implicitly understood, Adam Smith is, of 
course, responsible for the first modern, explicitly economic discussion of this 
organizing principle, and the wealth it produces by virtue of the gains in productivity 
and economies, or savings. It is also interesting to note, if in passing, that Smith’s 
characterization of the economic relationship between the city and the country is 
perhaps more closely aligned to the recent framework of Porter’s (1990b) clusters than 
were the observations of any other economist for two hundred years (Phelps and Ozawa 
2003). 
Nevertheless, it was Alfred Marshall through his Principles of Economics published in 
1920 that became the ‘father’ of the study of industrial organization by producing the 
 7 
now-familiar, original trinity of external economies: labor market pooling, inter-firm 
linkages, and technological spillovers. He explicitly contrasted the “subdivision of 
functions, or ‘differentiation’” in industry with the “integration” that followed; that is, 
“a growing intimacy and firmness of the connections between the separate parts of the 
industrial organism” (Marshall 1920:241). Thus, he distinguished between internal 
economies within firms, and external economies arising outside the firm from the 
localization of industry (Ibid. 266).  
In his Principles, Marshall first offers a brief historical perspective on the factors of 
primitive localization
3
 and then centers on the agglomeration-reinforcing factors of the 
three external economies. The principal external economy regards labor, for “so great 
are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from near 
neighbourhood to one another” (Ibid. 271). Access to the pooling and availability of 
specific, skilled labor is a significant advantage to the employers in that industry. From 
here we begin to see the ever-greater subdivision of work as “subsidiary trades” grow 
up to supply “implements and materials” to the primary localized industry 4 . 
Interestingly, he also discusses the advantage of inter-firm mobility
5
 afforded by a 
concentration of like labor – greater ease in breaking off existing associations to form 
new ones.  
Within what we may again refer to as the ‘primary’ localized industry, another force is 
in play, a truly impressive force: innovation. Marshall discusses this process as arising 
from the ether of the external economy, called ‘technological spillovers’, in the form of 
non-rival knowledge diffusion. Innovation exists, for in localized industries “the 
mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air” and among the 
operators of knowledge “inventions and improvements in machinery and processes and 
the general organization of the business have their merits promptly discussed: if one 
man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their 
                                                        
3
 Primitive factors include the kinds of resources available in the environment, with family groups 
operating a family business linked to these resources morphing into villages operating a village business; 
and later their establishment by royal patronage in situ or at another desired location. 
4
 Today these are referred to as specialized, or specialty, suppliers. Their importance in innovation 
systems and in the rise of Silicon Valley shall be noted further on. Among the benefits they produce in 
the system is a lowering of barriers to entry by supplying specialized equipment that would otherwise 
have to be produced in-house by large, established firms. 
5
 Fundamental to the recombination of ideas and talents, catalyzing invention and innovation. 
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own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas” (Ibid. 271). The importance 
of interaction between the operators of knowledge to ‘demystify the mysteries’ is clear, 
and it is possible to infer the role labor mobility and personal and professional networks 
or linkages in the diffusion of knowledge, which in turn upgrades the competencies of 
the whole. Also, Marshall implicitly discusses how “good” and “bad” innovations are 
distinguished. Peers recognize the value of good, or advantageous, innovations, and 
select these for adoption. Later, they may themselves become innovators upon selected 
innovations. Marshall indicates a clearly collaborative innovation process.  Ultimately, 
of course, the merit of innovations is determined by success in the market. 
 
2.2 Modern production-cost approaches 
 
Wood and Parr (2005), in discussing the production-cost forces of agglomeration, 
describe three classifications: scale, scope, and complexity. Each form of agglomeration 
economy can be both internal to the firm, or exist as externalities. Within a firm, 
economies of scale (economies of horizontal integration) refers to the fact that the 
marginal cost of production decreases as a function of quantity; economies of scope 
(economies of lateral integration) refers to the fact that the cost of producing two or 
more products in conjunction within a firm is lower than the cost of producing them in 
separate firms; economies of complexity (economies of vertical integration) refers to a 
lower final product production cost to the firm when it itself undertakes the various 
upstream processes necessary to its production rather than if these were undertaken by 
other firms, contracted in the market.  
External to the firm, scale refers to the Marshallian advantages of skilled labor pooling 
(e.g.: availability, reduced cost) and possibility of information spillovers; scope refers to 
when unrelated industries share and benefit from a common infrastructure and access to 
specialist services not specific to any one industry
6
; complexity refers to when “firms 
are linked in input-output terms and co-located so as to form a production complex, this 
co-location resulting in lower production costs” (Ibid. 3). Running parallel to internal 
                                                        
6
  For example, in Silicon Valley and similar clusters, access and costs are ‘shared’ to the key support 
services of venture capitalists, law firms, accountants, specialized marketing agencies, etc.. 
 9 
agglomeration economies, these external economies of scale, scope, and complexity, 
when spatially constrained, form the bases of agglomeration economies of the 
localization, urbanization, and activity-complex types (Parr 2002). 
McCann (1995), while still focusing principally on production-cost factors of 
agglomeration, redirects from Marshallian external economies per se. He identifies four 
types of spatial costs that together determine the economies or diseconomies of 
agglomeration for a firm or group of firms: distance-transaction costs (based on the 
input-output production function, this includes transport/shipping costs, 
telecommunications costs, and inter-firm executive travel); location-specific factor 
costs (again, based on factor input costs in the neo-classical production function); 
hierarchy-coordination costs (the need for face-to-face contact with other firms and/or 
customers for negotiation and coordination of activities). These costs diminish the 
savings benefits obtained by locating elsewhere with lower factor costs. McCann 
specifically cites the electronics industry as a prime example, as property, salary and 
other factor costs are typically lower outside high-tech agglomerations, but whose 
benefits are diminished by the spatial costs imposed by locating away from the hub of 
activity. The final cost is hierarchy-coincidence opportunity costs (the one demand-side 
factor McCann identifies, which essentially means firm proximity to market). 
McCann’s distance-transaction costs and location-specific transaction costs drive 
agglomerations of complexity as described by Parr. 
Let us step back slightly with regard to McCann’s third point, hierarchy-coordination 
costs, and think of agglomeration within the firm itself. According to Ronald Coase’s 
(1937) milestone work on the nature of firms, economic activity is centered within a 
firm when the transaction costs of coordinating production through the market are 
greater than they would be within a firm. Approaching Coase’s concept conversely, the 
concept of transaction costs has become central to the analysis of economic 
agglomeration. Co-location reduces inter-firm transaction costs and allows for more 
steps of the production process to move outside the firm and into the market. 
Transaction costs are “the costs associated with the execution of a transaction, 
including the opportunity cost incurred when an efficiency-enhancing transaction is 
 10 
prevented” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992:604 in Wood and Parr 2005). Such costs 
accompany both inter-firm (market) and intra-firm (hierarchy) interactions and include 
costs associated with determining terms (e.g. price) and costs of coordinating and 
transmitting information (also termed coordination costs) (Wood and Parr 2005). 
Hence, economic agglomerations beyond the firm make sense when the economic 
benefits of reduced inter-firm transaction costs arising from spatial proximity become 
sufficiently attractive to constitute a determining factor in firm location. 
Similarly, Stigler (1951) and more recently Enright (1995) have discussed how the 
reduced transaction costs associated with the spatial concentration of interrelated 
economic activities can provide firms with an alternative to reliance on in-firm 
hierarchical structures
7
. Enright (1995) cites how firms located within a geographic 
cluster exhibit lower levels of vertical integration than those lying without. This is 
primarily due to the increased effectiveness (and reduced cost) of the external 
coordination mechanisms (e.g.: spot markets) available to firms and their coordinating 
agents, allowing for a greater variety of organizational forms and mechanisms, leading 
to at-times indistinct firm boundaries
8
. 
Regarding firm boundaries, Enright (1995) cites the examples of how a single wool 
textile can pass through five or six firms before it is finished in Prato, Italy, or the 
hundreds of small firms in Solingen, Germany, that perform a single step in the cutlery 
production process. Enright also discusses how small, disintegrated firms respond more 
quickly to incremental changes in technology. Consequently, they are better positioned 
to take advantage of new technology
9
. Localization also reduces opportunistic behavior, 
as the news of such behavior is rapidly spread to other firms who then withdraw from 
and punish the opportunistic firm
10
. Increased levels of cooperation among co-located 
                                                        
7
 Enright (1995:106) also cites external economies in “access to knowledge of the complex material 
transformation process and specialized suppliers”, or access to a proficient labor pool and specialized 
suppliers. He also notes how “in many cases suppliers and equipment manufacturers work closely with 
their local customers to develop and improve products” and may then “receive exclusive use of the ideas, 
inputs and equipment, at least for a short period of time”. All of these observations are also true for 
Silicon Valley. 
8
 Very much the case in Silicon Valley, with what Saxenian (1994) describes as porous firm boundaries. 
9
 Very much the case in Silicon Valley, with its hundreds of nimble, specialized suppliers. 
10
 This factor may be less critical nowadays given the ubiquity of firm information online. 
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firms are also observed, such as bulk purchasing, joint training programs, and industry-
specific infrastructure investments.  
Building on McCann and Enright’s emphasis on coordination, or transaction costs, Parr 
(2002), later joined by Wood and Parr (2005), also discusses the spatial dimension of 
transaction costs, introducing the concept of transaction space. Transaction space 
approaches transaction cost from the point of view of socio-economic and institutional 
heterogeneity as it relates to geographic space. Heterogeneity of transaction space refers 
to the generally increasing differences in language, culture, law, commerce, and 
institutions confronting transacting agents. Transaction costs decrease, of course, as we 
approach perfect homogeneity of transaction space. This encourages agglomeration for 
functions where transactions are highly complex, requiring effective and frequent face-
to-face communication, and where product change is frequent, production runs are short 
and there is high contract turnover; this is very well illustrated by the high-tech 
production and innovation processes. Routine, low-complexity functions, supported by 
improved communication technologies, can relocate to low-cost locations over 
heterogeneous transaction space. The clear implications of this approach on innovation 
and innovation policy shall be discussed ahead. 
 
2.3 Clusters 
 
The now-common term cluster, introduced by the celebrated authority on competition 
Michael Porter in 1990, is essentially a business term for what economists have long 
referred to as agglomeration economies. Porter (1990b) defines clusters as the amalgam 
of interconnected firms, suppliers, related industries, and specialized institutions that 
exist together in a given location. However, Porter distinguishes between the two in that 
clusters relates the observable phenomena of agglomeration to international competition 
and strategy.  
While Porter generally refers to “national advantage”, he is explicit in that the processes 
of developing competitive advantage are localized. He underscores the fact that while 
“true competitive advantage in sophisticated industries arises from the ability to create 
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and deploy highly specialized knowledge and skills - to deploy labor and capital, and 
other resources in efficient and imaginative ways”, its development “is a localized 
process, strongly influenced by local institutions, local values, local culture, local 
history, and local economic conditions”. Furthermore, whatever of the dimensions of 
any multi-national enterprise, each must have a home base “from which emanates the 
impetus, energy, and insight to improve and upgrade” (Porter 1990a:190). 
 
Figure 1: Porter's Competitive Diamond Model. 
 
Source: Porter (1990b). 
 
Porter conceptualizes his framework with his Competitive Diamond Model, which 
demonstrates the relationships between the four determinants of advantage. These are 1) 
Factor conditions, 2) Demand conditions, 3) Related and supporting industries, and 4) 
Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. Taken together, these determinants create a self-
reinforcing system that provides both the resources to operate and the pressures to 
invest and innovate. To these central determinants, Porter recognizes and adds the not-
inconsequential factors of chance and government intervention. Chance is, of course, 
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any shock to the system outside the power of firms to control, such as “pure invention”, 
shocks to demand and supply, actions of foreign governments, wars, etc. Government, 
for its part, can exert positive or negative influence on the diamond in the form of 
subsidies, capital market policies, education policies, and, of course, as a significant 
buyer of goods and services. Ultimately, particular industries will succeed when they 
exist within a challenging environment that forces them to upgrade and increase their 
advantages progressively over time. 
 
2.4 Networks and innovation systems 
 
Another interesting approach, quite relevant to our analysis of Silicon Valley, has been 
to study cluster dynamics and success through the lens of human networks. Regional 
network-based industrial systems are built around horizontal networks of firms. In such 
networks, producers specialize, deepening their technical capabilities in particular 
technologies while maintaining close, but not exclusive, relationships with other 
specialists – suppliers, skilled contract labor, etc. – who for their part also specialize. 
Repeated interaction between a multiplicity of agents builds shared identities and 
mutual trust and reinforces community rules and norms, while simultaneously stoking 
healthy, competitive rivalries that spur innovation (Saxenian 1994). 
The network-based approach aligns well with another important current in the analysis 
of innovation within an agglomeration or cluster: the concept of regional innovation 
systems, which is simply a regionally focused approach to innovation systems (IS).  
Developed by authors such as Edquist and Hommen (1999), on the pioneering work of 
Freeman on national innovation systems in the late 1980s (Foxon et al 2005) and 
greatly advanced by Lundvall (Rutten and Boekema 2007), innovation systems is a 
systems-oriented approach to the process of innovation. The traditional linear view of 
technological innovation conceives of a unidirectional flow from basic research to 
commercial applications that satisfy market needs; this is not a very useful approach, as 
it does not describe what is empirically observable. In contrast, and at its core, systems 
perspectives emphasize the interdependencies and interactions between users, 
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producers, and other agents – and their institutional and cultural context – who, through 
a process of continuous and multilateral engagement in both market exchanges and non-
market knowledge and influence flows, together determine the direction and result of 
innovation. Interactive learning
11
 and evolutionary theories
12
 shape the framework. 
Many, including the OECD, EC, and current Obama administration, have extensively 
used this approach to study the performance of an economy’s innovation processes, 
identify system problems and provide bases for policy action (Foxon et al 2005, Yu and 
Jackson 2011). The regional innovation systems approach recognizes the critical 
importance of the spatial proximity of related firms and favorable, homogenous 
institutional structures for successful, accelerated innovation. This concentration of 
interdependent agents facilitates knowledge spillovers and stimulates adaptation, 
learning and creation, making the regional level the most appropriate at which to design 
and implement policies that promote innovation (Yu and Jackson 2011, Rutten and 
Boekema 2007).  
Innovation systems stresses comparisons between real systems rather than against an 
abstract, ideal system
13
. For its holistic and realistic approach to the innovation process, 
this concept and this empirical comparison approach will be central to this dissertation’s 
consideration of the problems facing RE. The empirical system that will serve as the 
basis of comparison is the peerlessly successful innovation system of Silicon Valley, 
which is characterized by interdependent and densely networked individuals, firms, 
support institutions, and centers of research, thriving in its uniquely open, 
entrepreneurial, risk-accepting and failure-tolerating culture. 
                                                        
11
 Interactive learning theory emphasizes user-producer interaction in the innovation process. It holds that 
price signal communication does not inform producers about user needs not already served by markets. 
Non-market, qualitative user inputs are necessary. This is especially true of markets – such as high tech – 
where products are complex and change rapidly. As we shall see, this certainly characterized the Stanford 
– Firm and Firm – Military interaction in Silicon Valley. Finally, it is noteworthy that a major concern in 
the theory is that established “knowledge structures”, originally necessary to the process, can later 
become sources of inertia and resistance to change (Edquist and Hommen 1999). A similar concern is 
expressed by Enright (1995) regarding agglomeration economies, and by Negro et al (2012) and Parrish 
and Foxon (2009) regarding incumbents in energy technologies innovation. 
12
 Evolutionary theory views technological change as an open-ended and path-dependent process where 
certain mechanisms introduce novelties into the system, and other mechanisms then select from the 
diversity. Technologies that ‘survive’ are “superior in a relative sense, not optimal in an absolute sense, 
and – contrary to standard economic theory – the system never reaches a state of equilibrium” (Edquist 
and Hommen 1999:68).  
13
 See points four and nine in Annex 1. 
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Important efforts to explore the success of Silicon Valley include Saxenian’s (1994) 
comparison between Silicon Valley and Route 128 in Regional Advantage, the 
collections of academic essays edited by Kenney (2000) in Understanding Silicon 
Valley and by Lee et al (2000) in The Silicon Valley Edge, as well as several other 
academic papers such as Isaak (2009), Sternberg (1996), Wonglimpiyarat (2006), Gray 
et al (1998), among others. 
This literature review has highlighted the forces that promote the spatial concentration 
of economic activity, and how that concentration of different but related agents is 
critical to the innovation process. Most approaches are cost-driven, whether they be 
Marshall’s (1920) agglomeration economies where firms seek to benefit from external 
economies – the sharing the costs of the external resources of infrastructure and 
services, skilled labor pools, specialized suppliers, and a common knowledge base; 
Wood and Parr’s (2005) classification of economies of scale, scope, and complexity; 
McCann’s (1995) link between distance and transaction costs; or Enright’s (1995) direct 
relationship between the heterogeneity of transaction space and coordination costs. 
Porter (1990), of course, helped us appreciate the determinants of advantage and 
relationships between interconnected agents of economic and innovative activity. These 
insights – particularly those of Marshall and Enright – taken with those of networked 
and innovation systems will be useful to both understanding and relating Silicon Valley 
and RE innovation systems. 
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3. THE SILICON VALLEY MODEL 
 
Silicon Valley is assuredly the world’s preeminent example of a high-tech innovation 
system, whose truly vibrant and prosperous
1
 regional economy is supported by the 
generation of accelerated, effective, and efficiently produced innovations that disrupt 
existing markets and create entirely new markets with startling regularity. 
Figure 2: Silicon Valley and Environs. 
 
Source: Saxenian (1994). 
 
While the term “Silicon Valley” is sometimes rather loosely employed to refer to an 
indistinctly delimited portion – or all – of the San Francisco Bay Area, or, variously, its 
technology industry activities, mindset, lifestyle, work ethic or culture, Silicon Valley 
                                                        
1
 Per capita real GDP by Metropolitan Area for Santa Clara – Sunnyvale – San Jose, which corresponds 
to Silicon Valley, was $90,959 in 2010 (in chained 2005 dollars), the highest in the nation. The 
corresponding average of all U.S. Metropolitan Areas was $45,557 (BEA). Moreover, this figure 
continues to rise (Wonglimpiyarat 2006). 
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does have a generally accepted – though not formalized – geographic delimitation. 
Lying along the southwestern portion of San Francisco Bay in Northern California and 
hemmed in by the Santa Cruz Mountains of the Coastal Ranges to the southwest and the 
Diablo Range to the northeast, Silicon Valley comprises roughly 1,500 square miles, 
spreading north from its historic center in Palo Alto to San Mateo County and south to 
Santa Clara County (Saxenian 1994; Kenney 2000).  
While it is a physical, geographic region, the Valley is also an industrial district, in the 
Marshallian mold, a cluster, in Porter parlance, and an innovation system, in emerging 
insights; however one chooses to label or approach it. Whatever the choice, the Valley’s 
edge arises from factors constituting an environment – framework, if thinking 
functionally, habitat, if thinking biologically – comprehensive in breadth and optimized 
to detail for innovation, development, and there-upon-built entrepreneurship. The 
development of this celebrated environment is highly path-dependent – owing to and 
conditioned by preceding decisions and events – having evolved largely organically 
over time and through successive waves of technological innovation; though the Valley 
does, in fact, owe a great deal to certain external interventions – significantly, 
government contracts, and some key interactions with the established east coast 
electronics industry. (Henton 2000, Kenney 2000, Lee et al 2000:2-4). Though the 
Valley’s development owes undeniably to a unique time and context-dependent history 
that cannot be duplicated, valid and practical lessons can be gleaned from an analysis of 
this innovation system to address the problems confronting existing RE innovations 
systems. 
As discussed above, the development of the Valley is heavily path-dependent. Thus, we 
shall break out our analysis of the innovation system into a two-strata model:  
1) foundational factors, which are essentially important historical interactions 
between key institutions and the respective relationships that evolved and 
initiated the process of agglomeration; and  
2) thereupon-built reinforcing forces and characteristics that turbo-charged the 
Valley’s growth.  
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If in the foundational stratum we are to reduce the birth of the Valley to two causal 
factors, they are Stanford University and the United States military in the fist decade 
of the 20
th
 century. From these, we can abstract the factors knowledge / know-how (and 
know-how supply) and demand. Further parsing reveals specific reinforcing dynamisms 
within these factors, such as the supply of basic R&D, a pivotal leader, adult education 
of firm professionals, and startup firms on the supply side; and massive, exacting, and 
sophisticated military procurement and policies such as cross-licensing and second-
sourcing on the demand side.  
Transitioning out of this ‘inception’, we have in the second stratum the reinforcing 
factors of support institutions, networks, culture, spinoffs / startups, as well as continued 
firm-university cooperation, and continued military contracts – which largely 
underwrote and fundamentally shaped the evolving phenomenon of the Valley.  
The first stratum is approached in chronological fashion with the second stratum 
approach evolving to a more point-by-point consideration of factors and characteristics.   
 
3.1 Foundational factors – Stanford University and the U.S. military 
 
When attempting to understand phenomena, we reflexively turn to its etiology in search 
of original causation to thus parameterize – excluding the preceding considered 
immaterial – and thereby focus and refine our study. This is an ungrateful process. 
Nothing spontaneously appears in time without in some way owing to an event before 
itself. Nevertheless, it is useful in terms of study to – while discussing prologue insofar 
as it is legitimate and reasonable – identify a ‘beginning’.  
If in this foundational stratum we are to reduce the birth of the Valley to two causal 
factors, they are Stanford University and the United States military in the fist decade of 
the 20
th
 century. From these, we can abstract the factors know-how and demand, within 
which further parsing reveals specific reinforcing dynamisms. From this relationship 
spawned the first firms in what would go on to become the Valley’s backbone and 
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prototype of accelerated innovation and economic growth based on a close cooperation 
between Research University, Industry, and Military. 
While many traditionally consider the birth of Silicon Valley to be the founding of 
Shockley Semiconductor in 1956 or the earlier 1939 partnership between William 
Hewlett and David Packard, it would be more accurate to, as Timothy Sturgeon (2000) 
argues in his fine early-Valley history, retreat further back in history to the founding of 
the Federal Telegraph Corporation (FTC) in 1909.  This is not only historically correct, 
but enlightening, as that many of the dynamisms and cultural characteristics credited 
and associated with the economic success of the Valley were already evident then
2
. 
While the electronics age has its roots in 19
th
 century telegraphy, electrical power, and 
telephone, the Valley’s electronics roots were in turn-of-the-century radio.  In 1909, 
Cyril Elwell, an electrical engineer recently graduated from Stanford University, 
acquired the U.S. patent rights for the Poulsen arc for radio speech and telegraphy 
signal transmission, a technology that produced continuous long radio waves within an 
atmosphere of hydrogen contained by a strong magnetic field. Elwell then turned to 
Stanford’s president, David Starr Jordan, and Civil Engineering Department head, C. D. 
Marx, to finance the startup
3
, which was to be based in Palo Alto and originally named 
Poulsen Wireless Telephone and Telegraph. After setting up a small demonstration 
system, the company took on new financiers from San Francisco, was renamed Federal 
Telegraph Corporation, and began to provide radiotelegraph services in the Pacific.
4
 In 
1912, Elwell pitched the technology to the Navy, far outperforming the competing East 
coast-based NESCO firm’s unit. The Navy immediately ordered ten thirty-kilowatt arc 
                                                        
2
 These include: the importance of local venture capital; close cooperation between industry and research 
universities; emphasis on electronic components, advanced communications equipment and military 
electronics; high levels of inter-firm cooperation; a fertile and tolerated spin-off dynamic; and a unique 
“Californian” professional culture (Sturgeon 2000). With regard to the paramount spin-off process, 
although it is commonly first associated with Fairchild Semiconductor (Klepper 2010, Sternberg 1996), it 
was actually already very much characteristic of FTC decades earlier. 
3
 A full thirty years before Stanford Dean Frederick Terman would famously likewise help finance the 
startup of former students Hewlett and Packard (Leslie 2000). 
4
 Notably, arc transmitters were sold to and installed on the fleet of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 
based in San Francisco, which operated between San Francisco and Los Angeles, California, and 
transpacific to Australia. While the Pacific service was profitable, overland service lost money due 
unreliable transmission arising from static interference (Sturgeon 2000). This highlighted the 
technology’s sea-based strengths, making an approach to the U.S. Navy natural, beginning the Valley’s 
crucial link to the military. 
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transmitters for shipboard use. In the period immediately following, the Navy 
incessantly drove the technology, pushing FTC to develop and supply evermore-
powerful transmitters (which it was able to accomplish with the invaluable assistance of 
the facilities and professors of the Stanford High Voltage Laboratory). With the 
breakout of World War I, orders surged
5
 and employment at FTC went from thirty to 
three hundred (Sturgeon 2000). 
Before the Great War even started, the technology that would supplant the arc 
transmitter and completely revolutionize radio was perfected in the Valley: the vacuum 
tube
6
. By 1912, Lee de Forest, a Yale-trained electrical engineer working in the FTC 
laboratory in Palo Alto, developed vacuum tubes that could be utilized in all three 
stages of wireless radio communications: signal generation, signal reception, and signal 
amplification. This technology would “play a role in the electronics industry of the pre-
World War II period analogous to that of the transistor during the postwar period: [it] 
opened vast and unforeseen new market potential by increasing the capability and 
reliability of electronic systems while radically reducing their costs, power 
requirements, and size” (Sturgeon 2000:23). 
Departing momentarily from the dynamic Research University – Industry – Military, let 
us shift slightly to the dynamic Industry – Spinoff – Military to underscore the early 
presence and centrality of spinoff activity in the Valley and the role of the military in 
that process, before focusing on the overall role of the U.S. military in shaping the 
Valley. This is not yet the fabled spinoff process of Fairchild Semiconductor in the 
                                                        
5
 To illustrate sheer wartime volume at FTC – Shipboard orders included: three hundred two-kilowatt 
transmitters for merchant marine ships; thirty-kilowatt transmitters for virtually all Navy battleships, a 
twenty-kilowatt set for a cruiser, a five-kilowatt set for a collier. Shore station orders included: a dual 
five-hundred-kilowatt station in Annapolis; a two-hundred-kilowatt station in Puerto Rico; a two-
hundred-kilowatt set in Sayville, Long Island; a two-hundred-kilowatt set in San Diego; a transpacific 
five-hundred-kilowatt chain; thirty-kilowatt sets in Alaska; a chain of smaller stations around the Gulf 
and Atlantic coasts; a pair of one-thousand-kilowatt transmitters in Bordeaux, France; and various army 
posts around the country took receipt of twenty and thirty-kilowatt sets (Howeth 1963 in Sturgeon 2000). 
6
 The vacuum tube was the first three-terminal device, the heart of all electronic devices. In a three-
terminal device, electric current between two of the terminals can be controlled by applying an electric 
current to the third terminal. This constitutes an electric “on/off” switch. By cascading these switches 
upon each other, very complicated logic circuits are built up. The vacuum tube was replaced by the solid-
state transistor, which was smaller, faster, cheaper, and consumed less power. These transistors were built 
with semiconductor material. A semiconductor is a material that can act as both a conductor and 
an insulator, that is, capable of both permitting and inhibiting the flow of electrons. Individual transistors 
on a circuit were in turn replaced by the integrated circuit, which incorporated myriads of ultra-
miniaturized transistors and other components in a circuit onto a single silicon substrate (Haviland 2002). 
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1950s, which spawned the prodigious “Fairchildren” that included Intel. This is the 
much earlier spinoff process at FTC. Spinoffs included: Magnavox, formed by three 
FTC employees in 1910 who developed loudspeaker and microphone equipment used 
by the U.S. Navy, later turning to industry and finally consumer electronics; Litton 
Engineering, formed in 1932 by employee Charles Litton, went on to become the 
industry-regarded reference in vacuum tube production equipment and high-powered 
vacuum tubes highly sought after by the U.S. military for use in ground-based military 
radar; and Gerhard Fisher, who invented the first metal detector in his Palo Alto garage 
in 1928,  left to form Fisher Research Laboratories in 1936 (Sturgeon 2000). Early on, 
the Valley was populated by firms from the countless other examples of spinoff activity 
from this period, quite often resulting from the incentive to satisfy the military’s 
voracious and ever more discerning appetite for electronics and aeronautical hardware 
components through World War II, Korea, the Cold War and the Space Race.  
Certainly, the Valley would be unrecognizable today were it not for the U.S. military. 
The U.S. military became the early, central agent in the innovation process in two 
capacities: as 1) buyer and as 2) (indirect) supplier of innovation. First, its demand for 
sophisticated military technologies created a massive, guaranteed, and price insensitive 
market for the technologies resulting from the various waves of innovation it itself 
fostered in its second role. In its second and at least as important role, in granting 
research and development contracts to Stanford University and various independent 
contracting firms, the U.S. military itself both charted and underwrote the successive 
waves of innovation to satisfy its own demand for sophisticated new technologies 
(Sternberg 1996, Gray et al 1998). Routinely, these roles converged on the individual 
firm, with the military agreeing both R&D contracts and subsequent production 
contracts with the same firm, guaranteeing the firm a market for the products and 
technologies it developed. Add to this the incentive of cost-plus contracts virtually 
eliminating all risk; we understand just how favorable the operating circumstances were 
for the firms in the Valley (Leslie 2000).  
Indeed, military policy lowered barriers to entry for new firms and greatly promoted the 
diffusion of knowledge in the system. With the aforementioned dual R&D and 
production contracts, the military offered new firms an inexpensive, low-risk entry into 
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new fields with attractive prospects for commercial spinoff
7
 (Leslie 1993). Further, and 
highly significantly, the military policy of second-sourcing
8
 its technological products 
disseminated engineering and manufacturing know-how, upgrading the entire region’s 
engineering community
9
, more so still than the cross-licensing of patents
10
 among 
firms. Even after the military’s share in the region’s turnover decreased, this practice 
was adopted by civilian costumers who also wanted to guarantee alternative and 
competitive supply of components (Saxenian 1994). Thus, “the orders placed by 
Department of Defense had a deciding influence on the local diffusion of new 
technological know-how in Silicon Valley” (Sternberg 1996:211-2). 
With regard to the first role, as buyer, World War II and especially the first significant 
conflict of the Cold War, the Korean War, had a dramatic impact on the Valley by 
increasing demand for electronics products from local firms such as Hewlett-Packard, 
Litton Industries
11
, Varian Associates
12
, Huggins Laboratories
13
, Lockheed Missiles and 
                                                        
7
 To provide a good and representative example, television and radio tube manufacturer Sylvania gained 
entry into the military market in 1953 with an Army Signal Corps R&D contract to prototype missile 
countermeasures (originally offered to Stanford, who passed for dearth of resources). Sylvania provided 
land, a building, and staff, while the army provided equipment and funding. Christened Electronics 
Defense Laboratories (EDL), the lab was established near Stanford to be close to “prospective Stanford 
faculty consultants and newly graduated engineers” and “where subcontracts for search receivers, 
converters, special tubes, and other electronic warfare equipment developed by university researchers 
could more easily be arranged”; Terman was heavily influential in determining which contractors earned 
contracts to mass produce Stanford technology. EDL subsequently grew into one of the largest electronics 
firms in the Valley. It also spawned several spinoffs such as Microwave Physics Laboratory and 
Microwave Engineering Laboratories in 1956, Reconnaissance Systems Laboratories in 1957, and 
Electronic Systems Laboratories in 1964 (Leslie 1993:81). Sylvania / EDL is a good and representative 
example of the tremendous growth and new-firm creation underwritten by government defense 
contracting, and facilitated by personal networking and the Stanford-Defense nexus. 
8
 Second-sourcing was a policy that ensured that there was a backup supply of critical military 
components, particularly from small, fledgling semiconductor firms. The military required that suppliers 
share both technical specifications and detailed manufacturing processes with competing suppliers. Many 
new firms in the 1960s and 1970s started as second sources and went on to grow and develop their own 
product lines (Saxenian 1994). 
9
 Significantly, knowledge created under government sponsorship was free and available to all. Thus, new 
West Coast firms could work with the newest technologies unconstrained by East Coast patents, as was 
the case historically (Leslie 1993). 
10
 Semiconductor firms freely cross-licensed their patents to competitors during the industry’s first three 
decades. In the words of Intel founder Robert Noyce: “Without so doing, no firm could be using the latest 
technology in all areas” (Saxenian 1994:45). 
11
 Founded in 1932 by Charles Litton, a Stanford graduate of Frederick Terman’s tenure (Saxenian 1994). 
It grew dramatically during early war years and was sold in 1953. New management expanded to satisfy 
military demand. In just three years, selling almost exclusively to the military, they tripled sales (to $6.2 
million) and backlog (to $36 million), and quadrupled employment (to 2,115) on demand for products 
like pulse magnetrons and tunable klystrons for radar, and tunable continuous-wave magnetrons for 
jamming and missile guidance systems (Leslie 1993). 
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Space
14
 – the Valley’s largest single employer for most of its modern history – and 
many other smaller contractors. Following on from the Korean War, the Valley 
continued to be fashioned by the assumptions and priorities of Cold War defense policy 
and the Space Race (Henton 2000; Leslie 1993; Leslie 2000).  
Indeed, moving on from the early technologies already discussed and with distinct 
military applications in radio and radar, even the succeeding technological wave of the 
integrated circuit – thought to be civilian-oriented – was itself a product of the 
military’s effort to miniaturize military electronic equipment between 1940 and 1955 
(Henton 2000, Sternberg 1996). While integrated circuits would come to have far 
greater civilian applications than previous technologies, the military, nevertheless, 
continued to be the primary customer, with its share in the turnover of the Valley’s 
semiconductor industry lying somewhere between 35% and 40% between the years 
1955 and 1963 (Sternberg 1996), buying literally all the integrated circuits produced in 
1962 at premium prices (Gray et al 1998), only falling to below half in 1967 (Leslie 
2000).   
As Sternberg (1996) states, at this inflection point, successful civilian markets opened 
up and military share gradually reduced, with Gray et al (1998) placing the reduced 
market share at 10% of all integrated circuit purchases in 1978. Nevertheless, military 
sales had “moved firms swiftly along the technological learning curve which allowed 
unit costs to fall low enough to permit them to penetrate industrial and commercial 
markets” (Gray et al 1998). Sternberg (1996) and Kenney (2000) argue that while 
government demand was critical to the genesis of the Valley, it became of minor 
importance thereafter. As Kenney (2000) states: “It is entirely possible that the features 
                                                                                                                                                                  
12
 In the late 1930s, the Varian brothers invented the klystron tube at Stanford. Again acting the venture 
capitalist, the university provided them with $100 in materials and free lab access to develop their 
technology in exchange for a 50% stake in resulting patents. The klystron became central to central to 
U.S. antiaircraft and antisubmarine radar during WWII. The university would go on to collect $2 million 
in royalties. The brothers founded Varian Associates in 1948 (Saxenian 1994). Varian's sales grew from 
$200,000 in 1949 to $1.5 million two years later to $25 million by the end of the decade, with military 
tubes accounting for all but a tiny fraction of revenue (Leslie 1993). 
13
 Founded in 1948 by former Stanford research associate R.A. Huggins to commercialize technologies 
developed on his research at Stanford. The firm brought the first travel-wave-tube to market and then 
expanded with military R&D contracts into other related technologies. By 1961, the firm had turnover of 
$3.5 million per year (Leslie 1993). 
14
 Lockheed Missiles and Space established its laboratory in the Stanford Industrial Park in 1956 and 
located its manufacturing in nearby Sunnyvale. Its reasons were the same as Sylvania’s (Leslie 1993). 
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initially important for initiation and early growth can at later stages become much less 
important or even irrelevant. One example is the dramatic decline in the importance of 
military spending. Today, increased defense spending might paradoxically raise 
engineering wage costs and divert intellectual resources from the Valley, thus inhibiting 
its growth. Another inhibitor is U.S. government control on technology exports, which 
lead to decreased sales. Thus, a once important activity, defense spending probably has 
evolved to being a burden rather than an accelerator” (Kenney 2000:9). 
While it is certainly true that features initially important to early regional growth can 
later become irrelevant, Gray et al (1996) argue more persuasively that in this case, 
while not nearly as central as before, the military’s continued participation in the Valley 
should not be diminished by researchers, as it continues to be an important player as 
buyer and indirect supplier of technology
15
. Indeed, the Valley remains one of the 
leading recipients of defense contracts in the country, in both total dollars and dollars 
per worker, and more than four times the national average (Leslie 2000, Gray et al 
1998). 
While for purposes of simplicity and abstraction we have reduced the first, foundational 
stratum to Research University (Stanford) and the United States military, it is necessary 
to introduce at this point the paramount role of Frederick Terman in facilitating non-
market knowledge and influence flows between the critical factors of innovation. First 
as a faculty member, then as dean of the engineering department, and later as president 
of the university, Terman was an untiring leader, facilitator and advocate in the 
relationship between the university and industry, the university and the military, and 
ultimately the military and industry; and he demonstrates the magnitude of impact (a) 
highly motivated “cross-pollinating” individual(s) can have on an innovation system. 
Terman, the son of a prominent Stanford psychologist, had been raised on campus and 
earned his undergraduate degree there. He went on to MIT to earn his doctorate in 
                                                        
15
 Whatever the latter-day market share, it is unquestionable that defense spending created the technology 
base for the semiconductor, computer hardware, software, and internet industries (Henton 2000). Further, 
beyond the continued funding at research universities and associated institutions (such as the Stanford 
Research Institute), the government funds local national laboratories such as Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, NASA Ames Research Center, and Sandia 
National Laboratories. 
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electrical engineering and returned in 1925 as a faculty member of Stanford’s 
engineering department, whereupon – in the mold of the early cooperation between 
Stanford and FTC et al, but on another magnitude altogether – he set about to foster 
close ties between the university and industry. He launched an aggressive, 
commercially oriented program in radio electronics, arranging for local industry to 
donate equipment to his labs, and also looked to them for his real-world research 
problems. To further involve his students in industry and improve their awareness of its 
problems and potential job opportunities, he arranged field trips to local firms and 
invited their engineers to give campus seminars (Leslie 2000). Frustrated by the job 
prospects of new graduates he advocated entrepreneurship to his students
16
 (Gibbons 
2000).  
Terman returned to Stanford in 1946 from a wartime post at Harvard’s Radio Research 
Laboratory with a renewed vision with regards to the role of the university, envisioning 
greater protagonism for the university in supporting local technology-based industry, 
and was determined to avail himself of his new and important government contacts to 
draw military contracts to the region. He redoubled efforts in encouraging promising 
students and faculty he recruited to the university to become acquainted with the 
region’s firms and the opportunities these offered. Meanwhile, speaking at industry 
meetings and though other forms of intense involvement, he encouraged local firms to 
examine what research being undertaken by Stanford could potentially benefit their 
businesses (Saxenian 1994). 
In his inaugural year back as Dean of the School of Engineering, he wrote: “The West 
has long dreamed of an indigenous industry of sufficient magnitude to balance its 
agricultural resources. The war advanced these hopes and brought to the West the 
beginnings of a great new era of industrialization. A strong and independent industry 
must… develop its own intellectual resources of science and technology. For industrial 
activity that depends on imported brains and second-hand ideas cannot hope to be more 
                                                        
16
 The most famous example is, of course, most notably when on his encouragement David Packard and 
William Hewlett commercialized their audio-oscillator, which Hewlett had designed while working on 
his master’s thesis (Saxenian 1994). They founded Hewlett Packard in 1939 and Terman even 
participated as an angel investor (Gibbons 2000) and arranged an additional bank loan to begin 
production (Saxenian 1994). 
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than a vassal that pays tribute to its overlords, and is permanently condemned to an 
inferior competitive position” (Terman 1947). 
Three institutional innovations at Stanford shortly after WWII, all of which continue 
strongly to this day, reflect Terman’s vision and pioneering efforts. First, Stanford 
established the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in 1946 to conduct defense-related 
research and assist local industry. Second, the creation of the Stanford Industrial 
Park
17
 in 1951 on university land brought important firms closer to the university, 
facilitating and reinforcing cooperation between the university and industry. Firms 
would hire faculty
18
 as consultants, as well as enjoy access to graduates – promising 
prospective employees. Third, the Honors Cooperative Program in 1953, which 
allowed local professionals to enroll in graduate courses directly or through a dedicated 
televised service for off-site learning. This program allowed engineers to stay current in 
their fields, strengthened ties between industry and the university, and facilitated 
professional networking (Saxenian 1994; Isaak 2009). 
It is noteworthy, therefore, that in his reflections fifty years on, regarding the continued 
role of Stanford University in the Valley, James F. Gibbons (2000), Dean of Stanford 
University’s School of Engineering from 1984 to 1996, noted three general 
contributions, which align rather well with the aforementioned. He noted:  
1) Transferring technology from its laboratories to commercial companies through 
licensing of technology and the formation of new companies by students, staff, 
and faculty. This is the case in the areas of computing and information 
networking.  
                                                        
17
 SIP, now Stanford Research Park, became the locus of the Valley’s activity, with both new firms and 
large, established East Coast and Chicago firms setting up labs in SIP to be near Stanford’s emerging 
basic research, the SRI, a labor pool of consulting faculty and graduates, and proximity to the nexus of 
new defense contracts (Leslie 2000). By way of example, new firms that located there include: Varian, 
Hewlett-Packard, Granger Associates in 1956, Granger spinoff Applied Technologies, Watkins-Johnson, 
Microwave Electronics Corporation in 1959; East Coast giants that located labs in or adjacent to SIP 
included: General Electric, Admiral, Zenith, Sylvania, Lockheed Missiles and Space, Philco, Itek, Link 
Aviation, Kaiser Aerospace, Xerox (PARC), among others. While some of these subsidiary laboratories, 
unable to make the transition from defense contracting to civilian markets, eventual shut down, they 
helped create the prototype for the integration of academic, corporate, and military R&D behind the 
Valley’s accelerated expansion (Leslie 1993). 
18
 Including Terman himself (Leslie 1993). 
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2) Replenishing the intellectual pool every year with outstanding new graduates19. 
This is particularly the case for large, established firms such as those in the 
semiconductor industry, where most of the development within the industry 
itself occurs.  
3) Providing continuing education to professional, who thereby stay up-to-date on 
the state of the art with access to Stanford’s high-quality distance learning 
graduate program. 
While Frederick Terman provided pivotal leadership in promoting University – Industry 
symbiosis, he and his efforts did not arise in a vacuum. Indeed, he can better be 
understood as a catalyst and a promoter of an extant model, an established pattern, 
sharply illustrated by the earlier interaction between previous university president David 
Starr Jordan, the Federal Telegraph Corporation, and the U.S. military. That early 
interaction involved close university – industry cooperation in research, early venture 
capitalism, government intervention as buyer and supplier of research, and a healthy 
spinoff process. 
Having established foundational stratum of Stanford University and the U.S. Military 
and how their interaction initiated the process of agglomeration and begat the virtuous 
relationships Research University – Industry – Military and, subsequently, Industry – 
Spinoff – Military, the next section turns to the second stratum, the reinforcing factors 
and characteristics that turbo-charged the Valley’s growth. Where the present section 
followed a more chronologically reverent approach, the next will consist of a point-by-
point examination of the forces and characteristics credited by the literature to have 
reinforced the Valley’s growth. 
 
 
 
                                                        
19
 To this end, of course, not only Stanford, but the many universities in the San Francisco Bay Area and 
beyond supply the Valley with new talent. Local institutions include the Universities of California, the 
California State Universities, private universities, and even the robust Californian community college 
system (Saxenian 1994). 
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Figure 3: The Silicon Valley Innovation System mid-20
th
 Century. 
 
Source: The author’s design. 
 
 
3.2 Reinforcing forces and characteristics 
 
The Valley has spawned successive new industries, as illustrated both in the text above 
and Figure 4 below. Indeed, what distinguishes the Valley from many other clusters / 
innovation systems is that the Valley has not remained static, dedicated to a single 
industry, its generic “high-tech cluster” moniker notwithstanding. The various defense 
technologies (radar, missile, aerospace) have precious little in common with 
biotechnology and social networking. This is markedly different from, for example, the 
relatively monolithic automobile (Detroit) and entertainment (Los Angeles) clusters. 
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Figure 4: Silicon Valley Waves of Innovation, 1950-2000s 
 
Source: Adapted from Henton (2000) and Wonglimpiyarat (2006). 
 
The generally recognized core dynamism of the Valley’s economic growth has been the 
spinoff and startup processes (Klepper 2010, Kenney and Von Burg 2000) wherein 
innovative new ideas with high potential economic payoff are quickly financed, 
developed, and brought to market. But for all the brilliance and risk-taking 
entrepreneurial disposition of individual agents, what fosters and sustains such a 
vibrant, firm-spinning ecosystem is what lies beyond individuals and traditional 
explanations of labor pooling, specialty suppliers, and technological spillovers. “The 
essence of Silicon Valley is the cluster of institutions dedicated to creating firms” 
(Kenney and Von Burg 2000:221). These institutions include the much-credited venture 
capitalists and law firms – who provide new firms with much more in terms of guidance 
and connections than simply money or legal counsel –, accounting, marketing, 
consulting, and executive search firms that are well-adapted to the needs and culture of 
the Valley. While not foundational factors, responsible for the birth of the region, as the 
Valley grew in dimension and complexity, these supporting institutions arose, 
formalized, proliferated, and became evermore specialized to cater to the needs of both 
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existing and, most crucially, fledgling spinoffs and startups (Suchman 2000, Kenney 
and Florida 2000, Klepper 2010, Ferrary 2011, Saxenian 1994). 
 
3.2.1 Evolving institutions– Venture capital and Law firms 
 
The two most important support institutions in the Valley developed in tandem with the 
technological entrepreneurial base: venture capitalism
20
 (VC) and law firms.  
With regard to venture capitalism, Intel’s legendary Gordon Moore stated that the 
‘engineer entrepreneur’ combined with venture capital was the essence of creating 
Silicon Valley (Isaak 2009). Half of the VC firms in the United States are in the Valley, 
with investment volumes dwarfing all other U.S. regions (Wonglimpiyarat 2006). 
While the earliest antecedents of venture capitalism in the Valley stretch back to FTC, 
with sporadic and informal examples of the activity throughout the first five decades of 
the Valley, the real beginnings of venture capitalism date to the late 1950s when a few 
wealthy individuals in San Francisco saw the financial potential of backing technology 
companies
21
. Arthur Rock was an East Coast venture capitalist who arranged financing 
for the defectors of Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories with the also-East Coast firm 
Fairchild Camera and Instrument in 1958
22
. These early VCs were wealthy individuals 
from business and not technologists themselves. They relied on their intuition. But with 
the success of Fairchild Semiconductor and its spinoffs, the founders and early 
                                                        
20
 Venture capitalists invest in company stock, becoming equity holders, and so participate directly in the 
success or failure of a firm. VCs tend to use multi-stage financing to factor in the changing dynamics of a 
competitive market and as a carrot-and-stick method of encouraging performance and aligning incentives, 
as progress on the part of the entrepreneurs results in increased valuations of the stock they own 
(Hellmann 2000). 
21
 The Small Business Act of 1958 established the Small Business Investment Corporation vehicle, 
whereby the government provided up to $300,000 in matching funds for $150,000 in private investments. 
SBICs were attractive because they allowed for the mobilization of more capital with less personal 
financial risk. SBICs grew rapidly through the 1960s and were the preferred vehicle until the rules, 
regulations, and public disclosure requirements associated with SBICs began to outweigh the benefits, 
where after the limited partnership VC format began to supplant SBICs. SBICs were a crucial stage 
before formal, freestanding, limited partnership venture capitalism (Kenney and Florida 2000). 
22
 Soon thereafter, Fairchild Semiconductor would produce a prolific spinoff process. If FTC was the Big 
Bang, FS was Inflation. It produced 27 firms between 1966 and 1969, with 124 the family tree by 1986 
(Kenney and von Burg 2000). Seeing the potential for himself, Rock moved out to San Francisco in 1961 
and would go on to participate in the funding of Fairchild spinoff Intel and many other successful 
companies (Banatao and Fong 2000). 
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employees of these wildly successful companies began to look to reinvest their fortunes 
in the market they understood best, technology
23
. This began informally, as individual 
investments or in loose associations, but over time, through the 1970s and 80s, venture 
capitalism began to progressively take on a formalized structure, providing firm 
creation support services that grew in sophistication apace of the Valley’s growing 
complexity. This is known as path-dependent organizational structural change. (Banatao 
and Fong 2000, Kenney and Florida 2000, Kenney and von Burg 2000) 
“Venture capitalists brought technical skill, operating experience, and networks of 
industry contacts – as well as cash – to the ventures they funded” (Saxenian 1994:39). 
Hellmann and Puri (1999 in Hellman 2000) demonstrated that firms who obtained 
venture capital were faster at bringing their product to market, and that this effect was 
especially strong with startups pursuing innovation (as opposed to differentiation or 
imitation), for which first-mover advantage was especially important. This success owes 
to more than mere financing. Indeed, having emerged generally from the base of 
successful technology enterprises, being former successful entrepreneurs, these VCs 
knew the business they were investing in and could comfortably take a more expansive 
role which included advising on business plans and strategies, serving on boards of 
directors, helping find co-investors, recruiting key managers. These latter two are 
examples of the networking role played by VCs, often considered more important for 
their networks than their money (Kenney 2000). Indeed, networks of human 
relationships and referrals are central to the VC practice (Kenney and Florida 2000). 
“Precisely because venture capital is more than the provision of capital, geographic 
proximity is important. Indeed, Silicon Valley venture capitalists rarely invest outside 
the Valley” (Hellmann 2000). 
By virtue of the difficult selection process (VCs sift through scores of applications for 
each selection), VCs also legitimize the startups they select and later seek to “sell-up”24. 
They play a crucial role in identifying the strengths of a firm and sharing knowledge 
about it to other potential investors, buyers and otherwise potentially interested agents. 
This information sharing is especially critical to firms such as Cisco Systems that 
                                                        
23
 This is a process that continues to this day in a virtuous cycle of successful enterprises spawning new 
VCs who in turn support new successful enterprises (Kenney and Florida 2000). 
24
 Acquisitions or IPOs to generate capital gains is the core object of VCs (Ferrary 2011). 
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practice open
25
 or ambidextrous innovation
26
, where exploration is decoupled from 
exploitation in the innovation lifecycle. Such companies prefer to acquire (spin-in) 
innovative technologies developed in startups or spinoffs, and focus on adapting and 
commercializing these in an integrated product lines (Ferrary 2011).  
It is pertinent to at this juncture to ask: who fulfills or should fulfill this critical 
facilitating, information-sharing role in RE innovation systems? 
In tandem with venture capitalism, the form and function of law firms evolved in 
response to the early success of the Valley, and has gone on to turbocharge the Valley’s 
growth as a vital institution in the business services ecosystem that supports new firm 
creation. Lawyers are generally the first institutional contact for new firms, who turn to 
them for trusted general business advice and help in both the practical and legal matters 
of firm structuration. This means that lawyers begin their intervention in the early stages 
of the structuration process, a time of maximum permeability and malleability, with 
relatively little conflict and suspicion (Suchman 2000). 
Law firms do much more than provide industry-relevant legal counsel and protection, 
though those in the Valley certainly have come to specialize in areas important to their 
technology clients, such as intellectual property, licensing, incorporation of startups and 
trade law. Still, they enjoy a much more expansive role, and like the VC firms they too 
evolved into influential network brokers (Saxenian 1994). A 1989 study concluded that 
the form law practiced in the Valley was “informal, practical, result-oriented, flexible 
and innovative” 27, reflecting the culture in the Valley (Friedman et al 1989:561) and 
the needs of its small, high-mortality clients (Suchman 2000). 
In his excellent discussion of the role of lawyers in the Valley, Mark Suchman (2000) 
identifies five roles of the Valley’s lawyers: 1) counselor, 2) dealmaker, 3) gatekeeper, 
4) proselytizer, and 5) matchmaker. 
                                                        
25
 Open innovation is characterized by porous firm boundaries where “large companies combine 
externally and internally developed technologies… to create new businesses”, interacting strongly “with 
different actors in their environment (universities, research labs, customers, exhibitions, venture capital 
firms, etc.) in search of interesting ideas” (Ferrary 2011).  
26
 Ambidexterity occurs “at a regional level through inter-organizational coordination” (Ferrary 2011). 
27
 This also applies arranging payment. Startups often cannot afford to pay up front, so lawyers often 
defer billing or accept stock in lieu of payment (Suchman 2000). 
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In perhaps their most important capacity, lawyers act as trusted Counselors, offering 
valuable, experience-based business advice to the often young and business-
inexperienced entrepreneurs of nascent firms, unable to afford specialized consultants 
for the many issues involved in the formation, incorporation, and operation of a firm
28
 
(also Johnson 2000). 
As Dealmakers, lawyers draw on their business connections to introduce their clients to 
appropriate transactional partners. They actively procure and facilitate funding for their 
clients through their well-developed links to the VC community; conversely, in this go-
between capacity, they also act as a filter for VCs, evaluating prospective businesses. In 
this capacity, they ‘mediate the flow of scarce resources within the Valley’ and provide 
the critical “brokerage” glue that holds the network together (see also Johnson 2000). 
However, in their role as dealmakers lawyers are not mere hubs redirecting contacts and 
resources, but serve as active Gatekeepers of the community. By selectively accepting 
and referring clients, their influence on resource flows reinforces and institutionalizes 
desirable community norms and filters out threats to the cohesiveness of the 
community. Suchman does acknowledge that this introduces the risk of potentially 
arresting structural innovation (see also Johnson 2000). 
As trusted counselors, lawyers are able to encourage their often-inexperienced clients 
toward certain types of deals and discourage them from others, becoming Proselytizers. 
This is particularly true in transactions with VCs, where they promote confidence, 
explain conventions, and suppress antagonism, thus easing and expediting negotiations.  
The final role, Matchmakers, is essentially an extension of the roles of proselytizer and 
gatekeeper. Lawyers encourage transaction-seeking clients to conform to certain 
culturally approved models. By formulating understood typologies, they facilitate 
transactions between agents. 
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 The cumulative effects of such counseling “tend to render the organizational community both more 
isomorphic and more institutionalized over time”; organizational diversity falls and interorganizational 
relations become more consistent (Suchman 2000:85). In short, lawyers help standardize, preserve, and 
guarantee the business culture of the Valley, with corresponding confidence reflected in transactional and 
operational efficiency gains. 
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Again, as with VCs, it bears asking: who, or what institution(s) might best fulfilling this 
critical role in a RE innovation system? Who might knowledgeably link the involved 
agents, help direct the flow of scarce resources and combination of agents and 
information, serve as advocate for the industry or specific technologies, and help gate 
keep the culture / rules and norms of a healthy innovative and entrepreneurial system?  
 
3.2.2 Networks connect the ecosystem 
 
Silicon Valley has a regional network-based industrial system. Hemmed in by bay and 
mountains into a relatively physically constrained space – early on clustered around 
Stanford University for access to its human capital, knowledge flow, and military 
connections – and reinforced by a hierarchically-flattened, open Californian culture, 
dense social and professional networks have flourished.  
Regional network-based industrial systems are built around horizontal networks of 
firms. In such networks, producers specialize, deepening their technical capabilities in 
particular technologies while maintaining close, but not exclusive, relationships with 
other specialists – suppliers, skilled contract labor, etc. – who for their part also 
specialize. Functional boundaries are permeable within firms, between firms, and 
between firms and institutions such as business associations and universities. Repeated 
interaction across a multiplicity of agents builds shared identities and mutual trust while 
stoking healthily competitive rivalries, promotes the diffusion of ideas, the flow of 
technical information. Recombination of these agents and ideas spur innovation 
(Saxenian 1994).  
For this reason, the Valley is sometimes referred to as a “knowledge ecology”, where 
‘knowledge can leak out of a firm… [but] if that firm is an open participant in the 
ecology, knowledge can also flow back into that firm’ with these feedback loops turning 
the Valley into a thriving ecology (Seely-Brown 2000:xiv). 
To understand why, let us use Seely-Brown’s (2000) conceptually useful terms 
communities of practice and networks of practice; which in fact describe something 
quite basic and intuitively understood. Knowledge produced within a firm or research 
 35 
institution is generally produced by teams of people, or communities of practice (cops). 
Working closely together in their particular area, these cops naturally evolve highly 
effective communication, a tacit understanding, and know when and when not to trust 
information or opinions within their group. Firms’ value chain comprises many 
different cops, each with different skills, specialized knowledge and forms of 
communication. Innovation, which can be understood as the process of bringing new 
ideas to fruition, or implementation, requires ideas move along that value chain. While 
communication across functionally different cops within an organization can be difficult 
– which can often arrest the progression of innovative ideas –, it is rather easy to 
communicate with functionally similar cops in other organizations. These are networks 
of practice. We are reminded of Marshall’s knowledge “in the air”. This cop dynamic 
also describes the efficient dynamic of start-ups, telling us why they are ideally suited 
for quick innovation.  
We have already examined two major network brokers, venture capital firms and law 
firms, as well as the professional contacts among like professionals across firms. Yet, it 
is important to underscore that these professional contacts are quite often also personal 
contacts. “Dense networks of social relations play an important role in integrating the 
firms in the Valley’s fragmented industrial structure” (Saxenian 1994:8). These 
connections begin informally at university, later on within Valley business associations, 
firm-to-firm interaction, or other fortuitous meetings. On the importance of constrained 
geography, Seely Brown (2000:xii) notes that this increases the odds of serendipitous 
contacts at informal settings at parties, restaurants, sporting events, at children’s school, 
where “you discover whom you need to meet, who is worth working with, whom you 
should avoid”. ‘Coupled with density one gets a remarkable petri dish in a culture 
amazingly open to new ideas, in constant contact, and willing to turn ideas into action’. 
 
3.2.3 Culture 
 
Such is the distinctiveness of the Valley’s culture that Silicon Valley is often used to 
refer to a state of mind rather than the physical place. It is an open and informal culture, 
interested in new ideas and experiences, much in keeping with the greater Californian 
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culture. This culture is put forward as critical to support and reinforce the unique 
business ecology that exists in the Valley, which in turn is necessary to support 
continuous industrial renewal and the rapid development and bringing-to-market of new 
ideas. Critical elements of the culture herein highlighted are: egalitarian values, risk-
taking, failure-acceptance, and labor mobility. 
In the open, egalitarian, and hierarchically flattened
29
 Valley, there is a greater loyalty 
to science and craft than firm. Information flows much more freely. In contrast, its East 
Coast competitor, Route 128, has a Puritanical cultural foundation that emphasizes 
loyalty to hierarchy, and so is characterized by greater loyalty to firm and an 
unwillingness to share information. Route 128’s inability to keep up with the Valley, 
despite its significant head start, is in good measure attributed to this culture of rigid 
social relations and firm-based industrial organization (Saxenian 1994, Isaak 2009).  
Isaak (2009) explores the interesting symbiosis / paradox of a stable, mainstream 
culture, which indeed envelops the Valley, as a necessary foundation for the free-
thinking, risk-taking “counter-culture” nevertheless dependent upon the mainstream 
system’s government funding and provisioned stability; macroeconomic and policy. 
“The stable, yet tolerant and risk-conducive, political economic framework permits the 
spirit of Schumpeter’s creative destruction to flourish and a hard-driving “cowboy” 
mentality to motivate entrepreneurs to speculate on making great fortunes through 
radical new ideas” (Isaak 2009: 136).  
 Just as taking risks is encouraged, the failure that often results is tolerated 
(Wonglingpiyarat 2006, Saxenian 1994, Isaak 2009). Indeed, if it weren’t, fear of 
failure would dissuade many from taking paradigm-shifting risks. Failure is not seen as 
a black mark; it can even be seen as a ‘badge of honor’, whence invaluable experience 
and learning were derived. In fact, failure is a critical element in recycling the region’s 
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 Noyce, founder of Intel and former Fairchild founder, rejected social hierarchies, removing all such 
symbols. Top management interacted directly with all employees, who were expected to “say whatever 
they thought” and challenge all, including the founders. Everyone received equity in the company. 
Everywhere former Fairchild employees went they took this ethos (markedly different from the buttoned-
down east coast) with them. Hewlett-Packard was also famous for a similar corporate culture, referred to 
as “The HP Way”, characterized by trust in individuals, high autonomy, commonness of purpose 
(teamwork), and generous benefits. HP pioneered a decentralized organizational structure with semi-
autonomous business units (Saxenian 1994). 
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human resources (Saxenian 1994). As put by John Seely-Brown: “nurturing seedlings 
is an inherently protective act. Yet thriving ecologies… grow more robust through 
death… letting [a firm] die may be more beneficial than keeping it artificially alive. 
Executives toughened by the experience of failure can be worth more than those who 
have had none” (Seely-Brown 2000:xvi). 
Of course, the recycling of human resources in the Valley isn’t dependent on the failure 
of firms alone. The culture of labor mobility – made easier by the physical proximity of 
firms in the valley
30
 – is a critical component of the Valley’s success. The Valley is 
characterized by fluid labor relationships, in which “a colleague might become a 
customer or a competitor; today’s boss could be tomorrow’s subordinate” (Saxenian 
1994:36). Also, leaving a firm is not stigmatized. Labor moves from established firms 
to startups, and startups to established firm (Kenney 2000) in a ‘continual shuffling and 
reshuffling that reinforces the value of personal relationships and networks’ (Saxenian 
1994). Further, inter-firm mobility is a knowledge-transfer mechanism, whereby 
information and knowledge circulate rapidly, thereby upgrading the entire region. “This 
has important implications, if the competitiveness is considered not at the level of the 
individual firm but rather at the industrial-regional level” (Kenney 2000:8). 
This consistent culture, within the stable and consistent macroeconomic and policy 
mainstream that envelops it, creates Enright’s (1995) homogeneous transaction space, 
lowering coordination costs, and accelerating the flows of knowledge, influence, 
resources, and the other ancillary processes that bring ideas to fruition. 
 
3.2.4 Spinoff dynamic 
 
The archetypal Valley story is that of the university friends who together begin their 
own startup company in a rented garage that quickly grows into a major firm or is sold 
up to an established firm for millions. Indeed beyond lore, startups are a real, 
inextricable and vital mechanism in the firm creation process, and their importance to 
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 Also, the ability to move around within the Valley meant that an employer might change, but one 
remained equally connected to their personal and professional network. 
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the Valley’s dynamic cannot be understated. Yet, another mechanism of firm creation is 
at least as important: the spinoff process. The spinoff process is an absolutely 
fundamental feature in the Valley’s model (Sturgeon 2000).  
Spinoffs
31
 are independent firms that are “spun-out” of a parent firm to focus on a new 
product or service. Startups formed by key figures that leave an established firm are 
also commonly regarded as spinoffs. The rate of technological change in the Valley’s 
tech-based industry is not only accelerated by spinoffs, spinoffs are only possible 
because of the fast-changing nature of technology itself, which prolifically generates 
inventions and opportunities best exploited within the agile framework of a startup
32
 or 
spinoff
33
.  
Klepper and Thompson (2010) model the relationship between the quality of a parent 
firm and the success of its spinoffs in support of the empirical phenomenon that spinoffs 
consistently outperform other new entrants and disproportionately populate the ranks of 
the industry's leaders. Separately, in analyzing the spinoff
34
 processes in the Valley (and 
Detroit), Klepper (2010) noted that organizational reproduction (spinoffs) and heredity 
(the lineage of the spinoffs) were key to the success of the industry and the 
sustainability of the ensuing growth
35
. Highly successful firms spawned superior spinoff 
firms, which then clustered around the parent in the nearby geography, creating the 
beginnings of a cluster. He cites the success of the Fairchild offspring in supporting his 
argument. In 1975, five of the top ten semiconductor firms in the U.S. were in the 
Valley: Fairchild, three of its spinoffs, and a second generation Fairchild descendent. In 
1980, four of its spinoffs, Intel, Signetics, National, and AMD, represented 32% of the 
total semiconductor market, in addition to Fairchild’s 7%.  
                                                        
31
 While there are several technical definitions describing the various types of corporate restructuring that 
result in the formation of a new company (Rüdisüli 2005), here the term is used in a broad sense to denote 
firm emergence from an established firm. 
32
 Start-ups might themselves be understood as ‘spinoffs’ insofar as they are re-combinations of actors 
and ideas present the innovation system milieu. 
33
 Incidentally, spinoffs are key to generating the high capital returns that keep VCs in business. 
34
 In his treatment, Klepper defines spinoffs as “firms whose founders previously worked for another firm 
in the same industry” (2010:15). 
35
 Noting the importance of organizational reproduction and heredity, Klepper states (2010:29) that “if 
agglomeration economies were strongly at work it might have been expected that all kinds of firms would 
have been superior performers in the clusters, yet the superiority was largely restricted to spinoffs and in 
particular spinoffs descended from the leaders that entered at the largest sizes”. 
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Spinoffs are made possible by the host of specialty suppliers in the Valley, whose ranks 
they may in turn join. For example, previously, most of the production equipment was 
made in house. If not for the development of independent firms producing the 
specialized production and design equipment in the late 1960s, semiconductor spinoffs 
would have had difficulty getting started (Saxenian 1994).  Specialty suppliers quickly 
became an integral part of the Valley’s institutional support structure, promoting and 
sustaining growth. 
In summary, the Valley’s origins as a hub of technological innovation lie in university-
based research and government military spending in the early 20
th
 century. Small and 
closely networked firms began to sprout, cluster, and splinter near the university, 
seeking access to its knowledge and human capital, as well as the influence that secured 
government contracts. This interaction produced the critical mass necessary for 
sustained, accelerated innovation. Through successive waves of industry and as demand 
grew and shifted from public to private, the Valley’s firms and support institutions 
(such as venture capital, law firms, and other business services) co-evolved, growing 
ever more diverse and specialized to support each stage in the ever-emerging, dynamic 
and diverse innovation system it has become. 
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4. RENEWABLE ENERGY INNOVATION 
The purpose of the present chapter is to analyze the problems confronting innovation in 
existing renewable energy clusters, with particular recourse the innovation systems 
approach discussed in the literature review. The system problems presented herein were 
formulated from a survey of the literature in renewables innovation. Concurrent with 
this analysis, we present recommendations to address these problems and boost 
performance of renewable energy innovation systems based on the lessons revealed in 
the preceding examination of Silicon Valley. 
 
4.1 Characterization of energy 
Energy is often described as a public good. It is essential to all aspects of modern life. 
Even if, strictly speaking, we classify the explicit benefits of energy (those for which it 
is transactioned, i.e.: the ability to do work) as a private good, there is no question that 
the inclusion of externalities changes this simplistic assessment. On one hand, there is 
the market failure represented in the unpaid costs of negative externalities produced by 
the generation of energy from fossil sources, most notably the production of climate 
change-inducing GHGs. On the other hand, the production of renewable energy 
supplies positive externalities (avoided carbon emissions) that are both nonrival and 
nonexclusive, allowing for free riders (Wiser and Pickle 1997).  
Furthermore, given the natural monopoly, network structure of energy distribution; the 
political nature of sourcing and provisioning energy; as well as the typical national 
policies of an affordable, reliable and secure energy system – in support of economic 
growth and general welfare – it is clear that energy is a commodity that deserves special 
treatment, including public and public policy attention. For that reason, certainly, the 
robustness of all aspects of energy system maintenance, renewal, and improvement – 
including the intelligent management of its upstream and downstream products / 
externalities – all deserve significant and careful attention, which, as has been argued 
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for innovation generally and will be argued for RE innovation particularly, is best 
approached through the concept of a regional innovation system. 
 
4.2 Renewable energy innovation vis-à-vis general technology 
The innovation process for technology is “complex and non-linear; complex because it 
involves a range of actors and factors, and nonlinear because technology innovation 
occurs through multiple dynamic feedbacks between the stages of the process” 
(Narayanamurti et al 2009:59). Indeed, as noted with the Silicon Valley case, the 
innovation system consists of many actors / agents and the relationships among them. 
These include universities, government agencies, established firms, start-ups and 
spinoffs, the various support institutions including law and finance, and ever more 
nowadays, other international institutions. 
Nevertheless, the innovation process for renewables is yet more complex. Transitioning 
to a consideration of renewables innovation problems, it is useful to be mindful of the 
following factors that, per Narayanmurti et al (2009), increase RE innovation 
complexity:  
1) market failures in the form of a) limited and uncertain market signals for energy 
research, development, demonstration, and deployment, and b) positive 
externalities of avoided GHG emissions and energy security;  
2) long time frames over which development takes place further hinder the 
participation of the private sector;  
3) significant heterogeneity between stages of development;  
4) competition with powerful incumbents and technology “lock-in”; and  
5) electricity’s public good nature serving as basis for multi-faceted government 
involvement
1
. 
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 For example, governments are interested in assuring the availability of future technology options, 
reducing risk to the nation and in the sector, developing more appropriate market signals, and even 
helping create new, desirable markets. Consequently, the government is involved as a major funder and 
undertaker of energy research, development and deployment, and facilitator of commercialization 
(Narayanamurti et al 2009, IPCC 2012).  
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4.3 Problems in renewable innovation and lessons from the Valley  
Significant problems exist in renewable energy innovation systems (Negro et al 2012) 
and the design of innovation policy (Bonvillian and Weiss 2009) requiring substantial 
improvements to meet climate change objectives (Narayanamurti et al 2009). 
Many of the renewables technologies that enable the transition to a more sustainable 
energy system differ significantly from legacy technologies. For this reason, they are 
termed disruptive innovations
2
, and thus require substantial changes to the various parts 
of the innovation system, which in turn requires more time and increases the chances of 
failure. Difficulties that arise in the development of new innovation systems are termed 
system failures.  
In modern innovation policy, such system failures justify policy intervention (Negro et 
al 2012), provided that two conditions are met. First, a problem exists, i.e. a situation in 
which markets fail to achieve socially defined objectives; second, the state and its 
agencies must also have the ability to solve or mitigate the problem (Edquist 2001). The 
first two system problems discussed – and likely the most critical – in fact relate 
specifically to the failures of governments. They are:  
1) A lack of continuity in policy, consistent throughout all levels of government  
2) Poor funding models appropriate to stage of development. 
 
4.3.1 Lack of stability and consistency in government policy 
Considering the nature of energy – its market failures, public good nature, naturally 
monopolistic distribution, and its complex innovation processes – and the public goals 
attached (e.g. climate mitigation) to renewable energy, government clearly has a critical 
role to play. The essential and overarching nature of this role is to promote a stable and 
predictable macro environment for confident decision-making and fluid interactions 
between all agents within the innovation system. Just as uncertainty is detrimental to the 
functioning of markets, so it is with innovation systems.  
                                                        
2
 A disruptive innovation is one that disrupts an existing market and value network, challenging its 
incumbents, while creating a new, substitute market and value network (Christensen 1997). 
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Erratic government policy significantly increases regulatory risk to firms who would 
otherwise seek to make long-term investment decisions. Misalignment of overlapping 
and conflicting national, regional, and local standards, regulatory and incentive polices 
cloud the private sector decision-making process (Negro et al 2012). The anticipation of 
policy volatility (as opposed to policy consistency irrespective of election results) 
pushes firms to make shorter-term investments in conservative renewables technologies 
– as opposed to long-term investments in radical innovation - that can be built up 
quickly to obtain the tax credits and other incentives that are likely to expire or be 
cancelled in the next cycle of policy destruction and formation (Victor and Tanosek 
2011). 
Furthermore, renewable energy policies are often written in terms of specific 
technologies instead of objectives, often with more of a mind to politicking than sound 
policy making. However, as Bonvillian and Weiss (2009) explains, innovation policy 
itself must evolve to become technology-neutral
3
, pivoting its focus to objectives and a 
policy framework supporting different types of technology-emergence pathways
4
.  
Governments desiring a successful RE innovation system should look to Silicon Valley, 
which “benefited from a mainstream political stability of governance in the U.S. that 
coexisted with a cultural revolt against that very mainstream” (Isaak 2009:136). This 
“cultural revolt” was nevertheless part of a consistent Valley culture, within the stable 
and consistent U.S. macroeconomic and policy mainstream, and promoted Enright’s 
(1995) homogeneous transaction space, which lower transaction and coordination costs, 
and accelerate the flows of knowledge, influence, resources, and the other ancillary 
processes that bring ideas to fruition. Governments must promote a stable and 
predictable macro environment for confident decision-making and fluid interactions 
between all agents within the innovation system.  Furthermore, as happened with the 
Stanford Industrial Park, large energy technology firms could co-locate subsidiaries 
with agglomeration-sensitive activities (Gray et al 1998) next to loci of learning in 
industrial parks within a consistent regional innovation system.  
                                                        
3
 That is, a particular technology should not be favored for politically expeditious reasons, such as 
appealing to constituents. RE policy should not be codified in terms of specific technologies, but in terms 
of specific support for emergence pathways and Renewables Portfolio Mandates. 
4
 See Annex 2. 
 44 
4.3.2 Poor funding models appropriate to stage of development 
With RE innovation, not only is policy stability essential (Negro et al 2012, Victor and 
Tanosek 2011, Carley 2011), but so too is stable public funding, together with private 
funding, throughout the innovation process
5
 (Narayanamurti et al 2012, Chapple et al 
2010, Victor and Tanosek 2011, IPCC 2012). Furthermore, the models of funding 
should vary appropriately with the stage of development and the technology-emergence 
pathway (Bonvillian and Weiss 2009). Government should provide substantial and 
stable funding support to unguided basic research and radical innovation programs – not 
established RE technologies – at research universities, institutes, and government 
laboratories. For innovations closer to commercialization, but for any one of the various 
reasons that might make it unenticing to private investors, the government should adopt 
a multi-stage funding approach akin to VC funding, as we shall see below. 
With Silicon Valley, we noted the absolutely essential character of stable government 
defense contracts in the founding and early boom of technological innovation. Toward 
Narayanamurti et al’s (2012) point about the heterogeneity of the various stages of 
development, in the Valley the government was supportive of the whole system, from 
research and development on through to demonstration and into production (e.g. cost-
plus and two-part contracts). This created a competitive – yet supportive – and open and 
collaborative (e.g. second-sourcing and the freely available nature of intellectual 
property generated from government funding) form of accelerated technological 
innovation. This was particularly true for the Valley’s early technologies (e.g. vacuum 
tubes and microwave electronics) where government purchases accounted for half to 
virtually all demand, and which were not consumer oriented – quite analogous to the 
                                                        
5
 For example, funding difficulties include the following: 1) It may be difficult for private companies to 
fully appropriate the returns of investments in some R&D activities, which reduces incentive; 2) firms 
may be reluctant to take on the risk associated with investing in a new technology that may not ultimately 
succeed technically or have a market (particularly given the role of policy in forming markets); 3) the 
timeframes involved in taking a technology from R&D to mature adoption may exceed payback 
timeframes required by private investors (IPCC 2012). Or, taken another way, the government’s role 
could be understood as filling the technology gap, by funding basic research into promising projects, and 
the commercialization gap, which refers to proving technologies by large-scale demonstration and early 
deployment, before the private sector becomes involved (Victor and Tanosek 2011). Quite analogous to 
the (unintentional) role the U.S. military played in the Valley with the semiconductor technologies, which 
transitioned successfully, as an industry, from over 50% government market share to almost entirely 
private market share. 
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likewise non-consumer oriented energy generation and transmission technologies, for 
which, as Narayanamurti et al (2012) states, market signals are limited and uncertain. 
Furthermore, funding must be directed towards true innovation. Nearly 90% of global 
investment in clean energy goes toward deploying existing technologies, which are not 
competitive without government support, and only a fraction goes toward innovation. 
With more substantial “pull” policies6, focused “push” funding could achieve more. 
Larger shares of these scarce research funds must be invested in truly radical leaps 
forwards (Victor and Tanosek 2011). Additionally, such funding could be managed as 
VCs manage their overall investment portfolios. A few highly successful technological 
innovations within a diversified portfolio of risky, ongoing energy programs would 
‘cover’, or compensate for the unsuccessful programs7. Also, like a VC, a law firm, or 
Terman, appropriately knowledgeable and positioned government officials should be 
actively engaged with the other agents in the system as a resource and facilitator, 
offering expert advice, brokering useful contacts, and in all ways trying to add value to 
their investment. 
With regard to the criticism that public funding of innovation can create dependency
8
 – 
that is, a tendency to keep technologies at the R&D and first demonstration stages rather 
than accelerating them through to deployment – the IPCC (2012) notes the use grant-
support models that are linked to performance and allow for developers to build a track 
record. Taking this further, we are reminded of the VC model of funding where 
financial commitments are made in phases as a carrot-and-stick method of encouraging 
performance and aligning incentives. Certainly this can be done in a way that transmits 
                                                        
6
 “Pull” policies include mandates, renewable portfolio standards, and carbon taxes. 
7
 It is worth stressing, however, that even then there is benefit to the system. For example, Ruegg and 
Thomas (2009) reveal that research funded by the U.S. Department of Energy is built upon more 
extensively by leading wind energy companies than research funded by any other organization. Even 
when DOE-funded companies ultimately failed, the intellectual property and many of the innovations 
continued into highly successful wind companies though patent acquisition and human capital migration. 
It also turned up in many non-wind companies. 
8
 Victor and Tanosek (2009:114) state that direct cash grants to “shovel-ready” RE (commercially ready 
technologies) during the Obama stimulus “gave few incentives to cut costs so as to make these 
technologies more competitive in the long haul”. Dove-tailing perfectly, a scientist with a military 
products Silicon Valley firm that did not survive the transition from military contracts to the private 
market said, “The government doesn't train us to do things cheaply” (Leslie 1993:85). The point to 
underscore is that the government should be extremely judicious in how it supports mature technologies, 
wary of stunting technologies by completely insulating them from competition. 
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the necessary stability to basic RE research, yet exacts increased rates of performance 
from application development. If a program fails to make progress towards negotiated 
expectations, the funding entity responsible (e.g. ARPA-E in the U.S.) should have the 
freedom to pivot in a new direction, closing the program and redirecting the funds and 
resources (Foxon et al 2005). Just as in the high-mortality ecosystem of Silicon Valley, 
even failure produces knowledge and human talent that are not lost, but recycled in the 
system in novel reconfigurations to its enhanced health (Bahrami and Evans 2000). 
 
4.3.3 Market bias towards embeddedness, the ‘Valley of Death’, and 
externalities 
Renewable energies must contend with the embeddedness of existing energy systems, 
and the resistance of incumbents (carbon lock-in). Fossil fuel technologies benefit from 
decades of deep integration into the economy, resulting in a large, expensive, and 
deeply embedded infrastructure, as well as socio-institutional embedding. This makes 
them cheap, efficient, produced in large quantities and optimally aligned to institutions 
and customer and firm preferences. The inertia disincentivizing RE innovation is 
tremendous. In addition, incumbent firms may also deliberately attempt to block their 
development (Parrish and Foxon 2009). 
Another problem is the limited and uncertain market signals
9
 for energy research, 
development, demonstration, and deployment. This is particularly true with regard to 
overcoming the so-called “Valley of Death”, which is the phase in the technology 
lifecycle just before market introduction and includes demonstration and early market 
formation. This is an extremely high-risk phase that has difficulty attracting private 
investment given the high uncertainties about market success coupled with high 
investment costs (Negro et al 2012, Bonvillian and Weiss 2009, IPCC 2011). For this 
reason, the government is typically attributed the responsibility for bridging this gap.  
                                                        
9
 For example, ‘the externalities of greenhouse gas emissions and energy security are not appropriately 
represented in the market, and thus there is wide-spread belief that the RD&D and deployment that take 
place are not commensurate with the challenges facing the energy sector and the technical opportunities 
that are available’ (Narayanamurti et al 2009:59). 
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Finally, there are the market failures of unpaid negative externalities arising from the 
GHG emissions of legacy, fossil-based electricity production, as well as the largely 
market-unrecognized and positive externalities of avoided GHG emissions and energy 
security. 
To address such market failures, we could certainly discuss the legitimate – and likely 
necessary – role of government-promulgated standards, including Renewables Portfolio 
Standards, fuel consumption standards, cap-and-trade mechanisms, and other 
environmental regulations. However, let us look again to the Valley and consider the 
role of the entrepreneur. The Valley has a history of innovative business models
10
, a 
fearless appetite for new forms of entrepreneurship and challenging established 
institutions and business strategy assumptions (Bahrami and Evans 2000). 
Certainly, given the embeddedness of existing energy systems, it can seem a hopeless 
endeavor for anyone but a strongly politically willed central government. While the 
majority of the literature, as well as this dissertation, focuses on the changes necessary 
to institutions, or socio-technical transitions, Parrish and Foxon (2009) position 
sustainability entrepreneurship as a critical tool in the transition to a sustainable 
economy
11
. Sustainability-driven entrepreneurs can “catalyze co-evolutionary 12 
changes to institutions and technologies, resulting in larger-scale socioeconomic 
transitions toward sustainability”, challenging the lock-in of dominant technologies by 
increasing selective pressures on other actors within the system (Parrish and Foxon 
2009:56).  
                                                        
10
 E.g.: Reverse markets, where clients advertise their needs to suppliers; “fabless” (no fabrication, 
design-only) semiconductor companies; so-called networks effects driven models, where a product’s 
value (and profit) rises exponentially with increased market share; etc. (Nevens 2000). 
11
 Sustainability-driven entrepreneurship “employs private enterprise as a vehicle for contributing to 
environmental quality and social well-being, in addition to satisfying the entrepreneur’s own quality-of-
life interests”. They are attributed gap filling and catalytic functions (Parrish and Foxon 2009:48). 
12
 “Causal mechanisms for co-evolution involve altering selection criteria or changing the replicative 
capacity of elements” (Parrish and Foxon 2009:56). “A successful low-carbon business strategy enhances 
the selective pressure for [its] institutional niche against its alternatives: for example, by increasing the 
expectations of other actors within the system that this institutional niche will endure over time and by 
increasing the dependence on that niche of other actors that follow complementary strategies” (Parrish 
and Foxon 2009:57, emphasis added); such as Tesla Motors radically changing the expectations of 
electrical vehicles in the auto industry. 
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While not unique to the Valley, this form of entrepreneurship is evident with Tesla 
Motors in Palo Alto, California, which was “was founded in 2003 by a group of 
intrepid Silicon Valley engineers who set out to prove that electric vehicles could be 
awesome” and “accelerate the world’s transition to electric mobility” (Tesla 2012).  It 
has arguably been quite successful at changing the perception of electric cars from 
underpowered, egg-shaped vehicles to that of, first, high-performance and style, and 
then, high mass-market potential. Sustainability entrepreneurs, by introducing 
innovative business strategies or altering the selection criteria, can diminish selective 
bias against renewable energies and significantly increase selective pressure on existing 
institutions, and so induce change within the market beyond their market share
13
.  
 
4.3.4 Knowledge diffusion 
Another significant system problem is poor knowledge diffusion and a lack of 
understanding between agents throughout the innovation system. In particular, there is 
poor diffusion of the knowledge created at university into industry, and a converse lack 
of feedback the from industry to university creates a misalignment between what is 
produced in basic research and what is needed for applied development in industry. 
Thus, a potentially highly mutually beneficial dynamic in the system is performing 
poorly. Poor knowledge flows negatively impact the effectiveness and understanding of 
the policy, technology, finance and demand communities within the system (Foxon et al 
2005).  
Certainly, we are reminded of the role of Stanford University in Silicon Valley’s 
success. Fred Terman forged close working relationships between Stanford’s labs and 
local industry, directing student research towards answering practical industry 
problems, and then diffusing that knowledge back into the system. The formation of 
Stanford Industrial Park, with new and established firms clustered close to university 
resources, provided a further mechanism for transferring knowledge from university 
laboratories to local industry. The Honors Cooperative Program allowed working 
engineers to stay up to date with the newest technologies in their fields, and also kept 
                                                        
13
 See Parrish and Foxon (2009) for a specific energy case study of sustainability entrepreneurship. 
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the university current on the industry. Likewise, similar university-industry 
collaboration on firm-incubating research parks and adult education programs should be 
promoted. 
This is critical, given the importance of the dynamic between research universities 
(institutions) and closely clustered large and small firms in a regional innovation system 
(Cooke 2010). An excellent example lies in the Californian East Bay, just north of 
Silicon Valley. Containing the nationally funded research labs Lawrence Livermore 
National Lab, Sandia National Lab, and Lawrence Berkeley National Lab – housed at 
University of California–Berkeley –, as well as several large petroleum companies, 
which lead the state in alternative fuels, the East Bay has by far the densest 
concentration of any green economy activity in California
14
, as measured by location 
quotient
15
. Energy research and services register an exceptionally high location quotient 
of 10.5 (Chapple et al 2010)
16
.  
Negro et al (2012) also highlights poor diffusion of technical knowledge causing a 
shortage of skilled staff to support the new technologies, for “when innovations 
radically differ from existing ones, [this] requires new educational programs and it 
takes a long time for the educational system to pick up these changes”. With regard to 
quickly qualifying a skilled workforce of engineers and skilled technicians with the 
competencies necessary for installing and maintaining the newly deployed 
infrastructures of RE, we can again look to the example of the Valley’s (and 
California’s) excellent network of state universities and community colleges. A regional 
economy, a cluster, an innovation system must have a strong and competent 
                                                        
14
 Fifteen entities were responsible for 29% of all Californian clean tech patents between 2000 and 2008, 
suggesting that large, well-established actors play a significant role in innovation in California’s green 
economy. In particular, the “involvement of universities such as the University of California and the 
California Institute of Technology suggests that the resources required to conduct research and develop 
new energy-related technologies may be so high that small firms and individual inventors are not yet 
leading the process of innovation in the green economy” (Chapple et al 2010:12). 
15
 The location quotient measures the relative share of a particular activity vis-à-vis the local economy. A 
location quotient of 1 means the activity is in proportion, below or above 1 means the activity has a lower 
or higher than expected share of a given activity, relative to the size of the economy. 
16
 Reinforcing our understanding as to the importance of clusters in the green / renewables innovation 
process, so central to this thesis, Chapple et al (2010) writes: “green innovation is highly concentrated in 
a handful of California regions… This clustering provides support for previous work on regional 
innovation systems and the association between innovation and localization economies”. 
 
 50 
complement of learning institutions ready to supply the necessary knowledge 
appropriate to all labor segments within the renewable energy value chain. 
Of course, one of the best methods for diffusing knowledge and developing new ideas is 
by employees leaving a firm, combining with other skilled and mobile actors and 
starting their own firm – the spinoff process, famed in the Valley. The benefits of such a 
process to radical renewables innovation is implicitly understood, yet let us consider the 
benefits of the inverse process, also very pronounced in recent years in the Valley and 
explored in the context of the concept ambidextrous innovation – the spin-in.  
Again, while large firms and institutions have a clear advantage in capital-intensive 
R&D, small firms demonstrate an advantage in R&D that is more dependent on flexible 
and skilled labor (Chapple et al 2010). We can quite easily imagine co-located firms of 
different sizes and related varieties benefiting from each other’s comparative 
advantages in an open, regional innovation system with ambidextrous innovation 
processes so integral the Cisco Systems paradigm (Cooke 2010, Ferrary 2011).  
Component technology ideas more dependent on skilled labor for development can be 
quickly financed and developed within the nimble vehicle of a startup that, at an 
appropriate point in its development, may be acquired by a larger firm (spun-in) and 
integrated into a complex renewable energy technology offering. 
 
4.3.5 Rules and norms of the innovation system 
The rules and norms – or culture – of an innovation system can themselves impair the 
fluid functioning of an innovation system. This is understandable, given the emphasis 
the innovation systems concept gives to the relations and flow of influence between 
agents. 
Negro et al (2012:3843) reveal that the most commonly observed system problem 
regarding entrepreneurs is how they interact with other entrepreneurs. They “already 
compete at a very early stage with each other, instead of forming coalitions and 
alliances” to better influence regulations and help form their respective markets. It is 
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“only after encountering difficulties, disappointments and lack of support from 
government [that] entrepreneurs select more cooperative strategies”. This type of 
attitude certainly further arrests the flow of knowledge within the community and the 
advancement of their technologies to commercial stage.  
To be sure, the protection of competitive advantage and intellectual property is of 
concern to all entrepreneurs hoping to arrange financing and profit on their work, but it 
is not insurmountable with the proper arrangements (Foxon et al 2005). Entrepreneurs 
could benefit from the example of Silicon Valley, where healthy competition did not 
take precedence over dedication to the craft, and where extensive cross-firm 
collaboration among communities of practice and liberal cross-licensing of patents 
resulted in mutually beneficial cross-pollination and established technical standards, 
ensuring that the practitioners of the craft benefited from using the very latest 
technology, and in turn advanced the craft. 
Further, given the focus of innovation systems on the free flow of knowledge and 
influence among actors, it is clear that any such system would benefit from emulating 
other dynamics and characteristics of the Valley, such as: flattened hierarchies, which 
increase speed of knowledge flows; labor mobility, openness and collaborative spirit, 
which lead to the recombination of ideas and talent into new ventures; risk-taking and 
failure-acceptance, which encourage the development of new ideas and, win or lose, 
create experience and know-how that is in turn recycled into new projects; and a 
passion for work and innovation of craft rather than preoccupation with place in 
established hierarchies of prestige.  
 52 
Table 1: Renewables Innovation: Systemic Problems and Recommendations 
System Problems Description Silicon Valley Lessons / Suggestions 
Lack of stability and consistency in 
government policy 
Uncertainty arising from short-term energy policies and misalignment across 
levels of government with regard to RE incentives and standards. This 
encourages incremental innovations and investment in "safe", conventional 
RE instead of high-risk, high-reward radical innovation. 
Silicon Valley enjoyed a homogeneous transaction space of a unique, 
shared, innovation-conducive counter-culture enveloped in a stable and 
consistent U.S. macroeconomic and policy mainstream. 
 
Governments must promote a stable and predictable macro environment 
for confident decision-making and fluid interactions between all agents 
within the system. 
Poor funding models appropriate to stage 
of development 
Funding models must be structured so as to best support the process at each 
stage, whether it be basic R&D, demonstration, pre-commercial (Valley of 
Death), or supported commercial. 
Stable R&D funding for basic research at research universities and 
government labs. 
 
VC-type, performance-based, multi-stage funding for applied research/ 
product development. Note: Large, unscrutinizing military contacts at this 
stage left some Silicon Valley firms unprepared to survive in the private 
market. 
 
Market bias towards embedded energy 
systems, resistance of incumbents 
(Carbon lock-in) 
Fossil technologies enjoy advantages of economies of scale, long periods of 
technological learning and socio-institutional embedding (including exerting 
influence to maintain status quo). Embeddedness tilts the field against new 
technology uptake. 
Risk-taking entrepreneurship and radically new business models can 
challenge the status quo, challenging embedded technologies. 
 
Sustainability-driven entrepreneurship can alter the selection criteria in a 
market and place selective pressures on incumbents to change. 
Valley of Death Phase in the development of a technology wherein there is a large, negative 
cash flow from increasing development costs, but the risks are not reduced 
enough to attract private investors. 
Cost-plus contracts for high-risk and cost development and 
demonstration. Two-part contracts - R&D and production - assured firms 
a market for their innovations. However, must be carefully guided by 
reasonable, established performance-based criteria to avoid dependency 
and interminable development. 
Market Failure Negative externalities of fossil and positive externalities of RE are 
inadequately represented in the market. 
Innovative business strategies alter selection criteria; can have a 
significant impact in inducing change in embedded agents through a co-
evolutionary process. 
 
Knowledge Diffusion 
  
Gap between the knowledge produced at university and what is needed in 
industry. Lack of cooperation and strategic direction. 
Diffusion of technical knowledge in support of new RE systems. 
The role of Stanford, Terman, and the adult university programs ensured 
communication between actors, directed university research to industry 
problems, and maintained a qualified industry workforce. 
 
Educational programs at CSUs and community colleges offered region-
relevant educational programs. 
 
Rules and Norms of the Innovation 
System 
Entrepreneurs compete at a very early stage instead of forming coalitions and 
alliances in order to be more influential. 
Healthy tension between collaboration and competition. Open innovation 
practices. Networks among communities of practice. A loyalty to the 
craft, flattened hierarchies, labor mobility, risk-taking, and failure-
acceptance boost the system. 
 53 
5. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
Climate change and energy insecurity constitute serious threats to the stability and 
continued viability of our modern society and global economy. Continued myopic 
dependence on fossil fuels, with its severe yet largely non-market negative externalities, 
is a dead-end strategy with stark consequences for our closed, planetary system. Beyond 
the grave concerns to biological and planetary systems as we know them, GHG 
emissions and cross-national dependency on the very lifeblood of economic activity, 
energy, increases economic vulnerability, imperils national security, enables distracting 
and costly geopolitical imbalances, and undermines national sovereignty itself. For 
these reasons, it is critical to transition to sustainable, secure, and low-carbon energy. 
To that end, we must endeavor to replace GHG-emitting primary energy sources with 
renewable energy technologies that will produce clean final energy – primarily 
electricity – to power our homes, factories, and eventually cars. 
To be clear, renewable energy polices are not meant to substitute climate change 
policies, “as the most cost-effective carbon mitigation policy is one that prices explicitly 
the use of carbon-intensive generation” and “energy policies are less cost-effective for 
carbon mitigation because they do not directly address the market failures associated 
with climate change” (Carley 2011:289). Addressing the market failure directly would 
mean putting a price on carbon, via a tax or a cap-and-trade market. Further “pull” 
methods include Renewable Portfolio Standards, fuel consumption standards, and 
outright banning of certain generation methods. However, in hand with this, 
accelerating the supply of energy innovation is critical because “technology supply will 
assure industry, consumers, and markets that putting a price on energy demand will 
work and be affordable” (Bonvillian and Weiss 2009:56, emphasis added).  
Supply of innovation has been the focus of this dissertation. More specifically, 
accelerated supply, for the provision of innovation is time-critical, whether we consider 
the time constraint is planetary (climate change mitigation), from policy (meeting 
standards), or market-based (first-to-market, competitive advantage). With that, 
however, we also recognized the interest in capturing the economic benefits of 
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innovation in renewable systems within regional and national economies. Industrial 
clusters are the critical mass at which innovation and competitiveness are achieved and 
sustained. In this sense, an external (planetary) time constraint is not the disciplining 
factor. Rather, it is the time it takes to produce innovation and get it to market. If the 
flow of knowledge and resources among the various agents interacting in the system is 
obstructed, if the stable policy support framework for the various stages of 
technological from basic research into mature commercialization are lacking, the system 
risks failure. Unless the intent is to simply be a buyer of the technology and not reap the 
benefits of producing it, those looking to stoke regional and national advantage in this 
emerging industry need to look to the innovation systems within clusters as the vehicle 
to achieve those objectives. 
If innovation in renewable energies must be accelerated, and we wish to capture the 
economic benefit of such innovations, we must, of course, understand the process of 
innovation, where and how it arises, and what problems obstruct its dynamic. Modern 
theory approaches this through innovation systems. Highly effective innovation systems 
are characterized by localization and so are often approached as regional innovation 
systems. A survey of the literature regarding the economics of regions contextualized 
our discussion, revealing the considered factors driving our progression of thought on 
innovation and industrial competitiveness; building from Marshallian agglomeration 
economies though to localized innovation systems. 
We saw that innovation systems are “socio-technical configurations of actors, rules, 
physical infrastructures and their relations” (Negro et al 2012:3837) including the 
flows of knowledge and influence in addition to market transactions (Foxon et al 2005), 
and that innovation accelerates when located within the concentrated economic activity 
of related firms in an industrial cluster, which facilitates knowledge spillovers and 
stimulates adaptation, learning and creation (Yu and Jackson 2011). 
We then took a look at the maximum exponent of an accelerated regional innovation 
system, Silicon Valley, for concrete lessons / guidance as to how we might address 
system problems, accelerate innovation in RE, and so supply the means to the radical 
changes we need in a short period of time. 
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From SV’s example, we saw the importance of stable government funding to basic 
research and universities and government labs, and of consistent and stable policy 
instrument support throughout the innovation process into mature commercialization. 
Government aid for applied innovation at the interface between research and private 
firms support should follow a block-funding approach, holding programs accountable 
for performance. 
Universities have a crucial role in ensuring knowledge flow between themselves and 
industry, apprising industry of new research, and directing research toward industry 
problems. These interactions can take place through partnerships on associated 
industrial parks and professional adult learning programs like Stanford’s HCP. But it 
isn’t just about research universities. The success of an innovation system and the 
competitiveness of a regional economy depends on a skilled and competitive workforce, 
including scientists and engineers from universities and technicians from community / 
professional schools. However, this also includes quality agents in support roles within 
the innovation system, such as lawyers, financiers, and other business service providers. 
Further, innovation systems would benefit from emulating the dynamics and 
characteristics of SV such as: flattened hierarchies, labor mobility, an open and 
collaborative cross-community of practice spirit, risk-taking and failure-acceptance, 
which all accelerate the processes of innovation. 
Finally, it bears noting that the central preoccupation of any region or nation seeking to 
create a dynamic innovation system within a renewable energy cluster is not the 
technology itself, but the conditions under which systemic problems to innovation are 
minimized and the factors promoting it thrive. As demonstrated, the Valley did not 
appear spontaneously, but grew over time from a confluence of purposeful 
complementary factors and reinforcing characteristics. Even at its supposed beginning, 
with Fred Terman, Shockley and Fairchild Semiconductor, the reunited factors and 
characteristics were decades in the making. Further, the Valley has not congealed into 
an IT cluster, but has continued to reinvent itself through successive waves of industry 
and innovation, branching most recently into bioscience, nanotechnology, clean tech, 
and other industries. Although a product of its history, regions that are attempting to 
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create the type of dynamism found in SV, can think of renewable energy as their FTC 
or Fairchild; the beginning of their cluster and a thriving innovation system. If we take 
the long view of history, a green energy economy is not simply the destination, but a 
path to regional and national competitiveness, and prosperity. 
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ANNEX 1 - Nine characteristics of the innovation systems framework 
 
Edquist and Hommen (1999:65-6) formulate the following, very useful, comprehensive list of innovation 
systems characteristics. 
1. They place innovation and learning processes at the center of focus. This is based on the 
understanding that technological innovation is a matter of producing new knowledge or combining 
existing elements of knowledge in new ways. It is thus, in the broadest sense, a “learning process”. 
2. They adopt a holistic and interdisciplinary perspective. They are holistic in the sense that they try to 
encompass a wide array—or all—of the determinants of innovation that are important. They are 
interdisciplinary in the sense that they include not only economic factors but also organizational, 
social and political factors. 
3. They employ historical perspectives. Since processes of innovation develop over time and include 
the influence of many factors and feedback processes, they are best studied in terms of the co-
evolution of knowledge, innovation, organizations, and institutions. 
4. They stress the differences between systems, rather than the optimality of systems. They make the 
differences between systems of innovation the main focus, rather than something to be abstracted 
away from. This means conducting comparisons between existing systems rather than between real 
systems and an ideal or optimal system. 
5. They emphasize interdependence and non-linearity. This is based on the under- standing that firms 
almost never innovate in isolation but interact more or less closely with other organizations through 
complex relations that are often characterized by reciprocity and feedback mechanisms in several 
loops. This interaction occurs in the context of established institutions such as laws, rules, 
regulations, norms, and cultural habits. Innovations are not only determined by the elements of the 
systems, but also by the relations between them. 
6. They encompass product technologies and organizational innovations. This is based on the 
understanding that developing a differentiated concept of innovation—one that is not solely restricted 
to the conventional emphasis on process innovations of a technical nature—is necessary to 
comprehend the complex relations between growth, employment, and innovation. 
7. They emphasize the central role of institutions. They do so in order to understand the social 
patterning of innovative behavior—its typically “path-dependent” character—and the role played by 
norms, rules, laws, etc. and by organizations. 
8. They are still associated with conceptual diffuseness. Thus, further development will involve 
progressing from the present state of “conceptual pluralism” to a clearer specification of core 
concepts and their precise content—a gradual selection process in which pluralism and ambiguity 
will be reduced by degrees. 
9. They are conceptual frameworks rather than formal theories. Recognizing that SI approaches are 
not yet at that stage of development where they are capable of formal (abstract) theorizing leads to an 
emphasis on empirically based “appreciative” theorizing. Such theorizing is intended to capture 
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processes of innovation, their determinants, and some of their consequences (e.g., productivity 
growth and employment) in a meaningful way. 
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ANNEX 2 - Technology-emergence pathways and corresponding recommendations 
 
Considering technologies follow several pathways to emergence at scale, for which different support 
instruments should be designed, Bonvillian and Weiss (2009) formulated the following noteworthy 
categories for common technology-emergence pathways with corresponding suggested support policies:  
 
Experimental technologies  
This category includes technologies requiring extensive long-range research. Deployment is far off so 
that the details of their launch pathways can be left to the future.  
Examples: hydrogen fuel cells for transport; genetically engineered biosystems for CO2 capture; and, 
well into the future, fusion power. 
 
Potentially disruptive technologies 
These are innovations that can be launched in niche markets where they will face limited initial 
competition and can challenge incumbents. 
Examples: off-grid wind and solar technologies and LED lighting. 
 
Secondary technologies (uncontested launch) 
This group includes secondary (component) innovations that will face market competition immediately 
on launch from incumbents. They are acceptable to recipient industries if the price is right, but may face 
built-in disadvantages to incumbents. 
Examples: advanced batteries for plug-in hybrids, enhanced geothermal, and on-grid wind and solar. 
 
Secondary technologies (contested launch) 
In addition to the barriers facing uncontested technologies, may face economic, political, or other 
opposition from industries our groups. 
Examples: carbon capture and sequestration, biofuels, and fourth-generation nuclear power. 
 
Incremental innovations in conservation and end-use efficiency 
These innovations may be implemented in the short term, but may present high initial costs and long 
payback times. 
Examples: improved internal combustion engines, improved building technologies, efficient appliances, 
improved lighting, and new technologies for electric power distribution. 
 
Improvements in manufacturing technologies and processes 
These innovations drive down costs and improve efficiency, but may be dissuasive to investors in the 
absence of market pressure. 
 
 
To these, the authors espouse the following support policies: 
 
Front-end technology nurturing 
For technology that is far from commercialization along all six pathways. 
Actions include: direct government support for long- and short- term R&D, technology prototyping, and 
demonstrations. 
 
Back-end incentives 
To close the gap between emerging and incumbent technologies facing both uncontested and contested 
launch, incremental innovations in technology for conservation and end use, and technologies for 
manufacturing. 
Actions include: tax credits, loan guarantees, low-cost financing, price guarantees, government 
procurement programs (including military), new-product buy-down programs, and general and 
technology-specific intellectual property policies. 
 
Back-end regulatory and related mandates 
Actions include: standards regarding energy applications across sectors, regulatory mandates such as 
renewable portfolio standards and fuel economy standards, and emission taxes.  
